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Game theory is a tool to analyze agentsinteractive strategic behavior in
various situations and it is widely applied in economic study. The study of
game theory includes the analysis of rational strategic behavior, based on
which various solution concepts are developed. This thesis consists of three
essays on game theory and analyzes both equilibrium and non-equilibrium
solution concepts.
In the rst essay, we study the existence and uniqueness (or order inde-
pendence) of iterated elimination procedure from a choice-theoretic view-
point. We show a general existence result of iterated elimination procedure
on an abstract reduction system. We identify a su¢ cient condition of
Monotonicity* for the order independence and, in (in)nite games, we
provide a full characterization of Monotonicity*. We also demonstrate that
our approach is applicable to any form of iterated elimination processes in
arbitrary strategic games, e.g., iterated strict dominance, iterated weak
dominance, rationalizability, etc.
In the second essay, we study Pearces (1984) extensive form rational-
izability (EFR), as a special kind of iterated elimination procedure, under
general preferences. The main result of this paper shows that in generic
perfect information games, for any model of conditional preference that ad-
mits all subjective expected utilities consistent with Bayesian updating and
satises a rather weak monotonicity condition, the EFR strategy proles
yield the backward induction outcome. Moreover, if the model admits all
vi
preferences (satisfying the rather weak monotonicity condition), then the
elimination procedure associated with EFR coincides with the backward
iterated dominance procedure.
In the third essay, we follow Blume and Zame (Econometrica 62:783-794,
1994) to study the relationship between perfectly and sequentially rational
strategic behavior from the point of view of semi-algebraic geometry. We
present a unied framework for analyzing rational strategic behavior, with
diversiform structures of beliefs, in extensive games. In this paper, we show
a general genericequivalence theorem between perfect rationality and se-
quential rationality, which is applicable to various solution concepts such as
equilibrium, rationalizability, iterated dominance and mutually acceptable
course of action (MACA).
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1 A unied approach to iterated elimination
procedures
1.1 Introduction
It is important and useful to dene solution concepts by using iterated
elimination procedures in game theory and economics. Notably, iterated
elimination of strictly dominated strategies (IESDS), iterated elimination
of weakly dominated strategies (IEWDS), iterated elimination of never-best
responses (IENBR), and the backward induction principle are extensively
discussed in game theory; see, e.g., Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, Chapter
4).1 Intuitively, the iterated elimination procedures are profoundly related
to the assumption of common knowledge of rationality.
Most of the research in the literature has been restricted to specic
forms of iterated elimination procedures in nite or CC games (where
CC means strategy sets are compact and payo¤ functions are continuous).
While IESDS always exists and is order independent in CC games, it could
be ill-behaved in arbitrary strategic games (see Dufwenberg and Stegeman
(2002) and Chen et al. (2007)). To generally examine this issue, we here
consider any form of iterated elimination procedures in arbitrary strate-
1In contrast to the xed-point method used in the equilibrium approach, this al-
ternative approach develops solution concepts by using iterative procedures, for exam-
ple, Bernheim (1984) and Pearces (1984) notion of rationalizability, Dekel and Fuden-
bergs (1990) iterative procedure, Borgerss (1994) iterated pure-strategy dominance,
Guls (1996)  -theories, Asheim and Dufwenbergs (2003) concept of a fully permissi-
ble set, Ambruss (2006) denition of coalitional rationalizability, Cubitt and Sugdens
(2011) reasoning-based iterative procedure, Halpern and Passs (2012) iterated regret-
minimization procedure, and Hillas and Samets (2014) iterative elimination of aws of
weakly dominated strategies.
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gic games. In this paper, we study the existence and uniqueness of nal
outcomes (or order independence) of iterated elimination procedure from a
choice-theoretic viewpoint.2 More specically, we adopt the classical theory
of choice in which the set of outcomes is formalized by a choice rule that
species the acceptable/desirable choices. The reduction relation speci-
es that any feasible reduction from a given set is a deletion of elements
outside the choice set. We consider all nite and transnite sequences of
reduction in any arbitrary abstract reduction system. For example, iter-
ated deletion of strictly dominated strategies can be viewed as an (in)nite
sequence of reduction in an abstract reduction system associated with the
strict domination relation. Innite and transnite sequences of reduction
has signicance in economic theory and game theory. For example, the
Nash equilibrium in standard Cournot game (Moulin, 1984) can be solved
by an innite sequences of IESDS. Moreover, Lipman (1994) pointed out
that the strategic implication of common knowledge of rationality can
only be characterized by an uncountably innite iterated elimination of
never best replies.
We show the existence of iterated elimination procedure for any arbi-
trary abstract reduction system (Theorem 1(a)). Except for the Zemerlo
Fraenkel (ZF) axioms of set theory, our proof of the existence requires nei-
ther the Axiom of Choice nor the Well-Ordering Principle. Our existence
2Duggan and Le Breton (2014) modeled a players decision as a choice set and ana-
lyzed set-valued solution concepts in nite games. Trost (2014) formulated each players
decision as an individual choice problem under uncertainty and o¤ered some epistemic
motivation for order-independent elimination procedures in nite games.
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theorem implies that there always exists an iterative elimination procedure
for any arbitrary game by allowing a transnite reduction sequence. In ad-
dition, under a (strong) condition of Monotonicity, the iterated elimination
procedure is order independent and preserves all xed-points(Theorem
1(b)).
In this paper, we follow Gilboa et al. (1990) to seek weaker su¢ -
cient conditions for order independence that can be used for various forms
of iterated elimination procedure including nite and innite elimination
processes used in game theory. The major feature of this paper is that
we impose no restrictions on the structure of games, possibly with in-
nite strategy spaces and discontinuous payo¤ functions. In the literature
on game theory, most of the discussions on order independence focused
on nite reduction sequences (in nite games); see, e.g., Gilboa et al.
(1990), Osborne and Rubinstein (1994), Marx and Swinkels (1997), Asheim
and Dufwenberg (2003), Apt (2004, 2011), Ambrus (2006, 2009), Tercieux
(2006), Oyama and Tercieux (2009), Cubitt and Sugden (2011), Chen and
Micali (2013) and Hillas and Samet (2014). Only a few of the research
papers, e.g., Lipman (1994), Ritzberger (2002), Dufwenberg and Stegeman
(2002), Green (2011), Chen et al. (2007, 2015), dealt with order indepen-
dence for innite reduction sequences in innite games, with restrictions to
the iterated strict dominance or rationalizability.3 In this paper, we iden-
tify a fairly weak condition of Monotonicity*for the order independence
3See also Arieli (2010) and Halpern and Pass (2012) for related discussions on (in-
nitely) iterative elimination procedures.
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on any arbitrary abstract reduction system (Theorem 2).
Roughly speaking, Monotonicity* requires that: along a reduction se-
quence, no undesirable alternative (which is outside a choice set) be changed
to a desirable alternative after removing some of the undesirable alterna-
tives, that is, choice sets are never expansive along an elimination path.
The following example shows that, while iterated weak dominance is, in
general, not an order-independent elimination procedure, it can be order
independent and satisfy Monotonicity* in some particular game. Consider
a two-person game (where player 1 chooses a row and player 2 chooses a
column):
y1 y2 y3
x1 1; 1 1; 1 0; 0
x2 0; 1 1; 1 2; 1
x3 0; 0 0; 0 2; 1
For any subset X of strategy proles, choice set c (X) consists of all weakly
undominated strategy proles in the reduced game with strategy-prole
space X. The iterated weak dominance yields a unique outcome path:
fx1; x2; x3g  fy1; y2; y3g ! fx1; x2g  fy1; y2; y3g ! fx1; x2g  fy1; y2g !
fx1gfy1; y2g, along which the choice rule c satises a monotonicity prop-
erty: c (Y )  c (X) if Y  X. (In this game, the choice rule c fails to sat-
isfy the monotonicity property o¤this outcome path, e.g., c (fx2g  fy2; y3g) 6
c (fx2; x3g  fy2; y3g).) That is, the game of this example satises the suf-
cient condition of Monotonicity* for order independence.4
4This example fails to satisfy the original nice weak dominance condition due to
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In nite games, iterated strict dominance is indeed an order-independent
elimination procedure, which actually satises Monotonicity* (because each
strictly dominated strategy in any nite game remains to be strictly dom-
inated in a reduced game after eliminating some of the strictly dominated
strategies). However, in innite games, iterated strict dominance might not
be order-independent; the order dependence problem in innite games is
much more complicated and deeper (see Dufwenberg and Stegeman (2002)
for extensive discussions). In particular, Monotonicity* may fail to be sat-
ised in this case: a strictly dominated strategy in an innite game can
be changed to a strictly undominated strategy after eliminating some of
the strictly dominated strategies.5 Our main result of Theorem 2 implies
that, if Monotonicity* holds, iterated strict dominance must be order in-
dependent in both nite games and innite games. Exploring su¢ cient
conditions for order independence for any kind of nitely and transnitely
iterated elimination procedures is the main focus of this paper.
We also apply our analysis to game theory. In nite games, Apt (2011)
o¤ered a uniform proof of order independence for various strategy elimina-
tion procedures based on Newmans (1942) Lemma; see also Apt (2004).
We obtain Apts (2011) Theorem 1 as a corollary of Theorem 2 (Corol-
lary 1). In addition, we demonstrate how to apply our analysis of order
Marx and Swinkels (1997); see Section 3.1 for more discussions.
5For example, consider a simple one-person game where the strategy space is X =
(0; 1) and the payo¤ function is u(x) = x for every strategy x. Obviously, every strategy
is strictly dominated and choice set c (X) = ?. We can eliminate in round one all
strategies except a particular strategy x in (0; 1). Thus, c (fxg) = fxg * c (X), which
violates Monotonicity*.
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independence to some of the iterated elimination processes discussed in the
literature, including iterated strict dominance, iterated weak dominance
and rationalizability.
In innite games, we provide a full characterization of Monotonicity*
by Hereditarity* (Theorem 3). In contrast to the Monotonicity* property
on choice sets of desirable alternatives, Hereditarity* is a property for sets
of undesirable alternatives  i.e. dominated elements under an abstract
dominance relation which can be often used in the context of games.
Along the lines of Jacksons (1992) idea of boundednesswhich requires
any eliminated strategy to be justied by an undominated dominator, we
introduce a novel and useful denition of closed under dominance* (CD*)
games, including all compact and own-uppersemicontinuous games, to es-
tablish an order independence result in innite games. In CD* games, we
show that Gilboa et al.s (1990) procedure is an order-independent iterated
elimination procedure (Corollary 4). In the special case of nite games, we
also show that the result holds true under a simple form of 1-CD* games
(Corollaries 2 and 3).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we dene
the iterated elimination procedure on an abstract reduction system and es-
tablish its existence. We investigate the uniqueness of iterated elimination
procedure and show the order independence result under Monotonicity*.
In Section 3, we apply our analysis to nite and innite games. We provide
a full characterization of Monotonicity* by Hereditarity*. We also show an
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order independence result in the class of CD* games. Section 4 concludes.
To facilitate reading, all the proofs are relegated to the appendixes.
1.2 Iterated elimination procedures
Consider an arbitrary set S of alternatives.6 A choice rule on S is a function
c : 2S ! 2S which designates a choice set c (X)  X for each subsetX  S.
For the purpose of this paper, we do not require the nonemptiness of choice
sets. (Note that, for arbitrary function f : 2S ! 2S, we can dene a choice
rule cf on S by cf (X) = X\f (X) for all X  S.) We interpret that, when
faced with the set X of alternatives, all elements in the choice set c (X) are
regarded as choosable/acceptableoutcomes the alternatives that can
be chosen; cf. Sen (1993, p.499). Throughout this paper, we denote by X
and Y subsets of S. A choice rule c is said to satisfy Monotonicity if
[Y  X]) [c (Y )  c (X)] ;
that is, there are no fewer acceptable outcomes available within a wider
scope of feasible alternatives.
We dene the reduction relation ! for the choice problem (S; c) as
follows:
X ! Y i¤ c (X)  Y  X.
That is, X can be reduced to Y i¤ no element in c (X) is eliminated from
X to a subset Y of X. Apparently, we allow X ! X for any X  S. We
6Throughout this paper, we assume that sets satisfy the ZF axioms (cf., e.g., Jech
2003, p.3).
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denote by (S;!) the abstract reduction system for the choice problem (S; c).
We dene the iterated elimination procedure on the abstract reduction
system (S;!), possibly by using a transnite process of reduction.7 Let 0
denote the rst element in an ordinal , and let +1 denote the successor
to  in .
7Since the set S may be innite, it is natural and necessary for us to consider a
transnite sequence of reduction on (S;!). Lipman (1994) demonstrated that, in in-
nite games, we need the transnite induction to deal with the strategic implication of
common knowledge of rationality; see also Chen et al. (2007, Example 1) and Green
(2011) for more discussions.
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Denition 1. An iterated elimination process (IEP) for the choice problem
(S; c) is a reduction sequence fXg on (S;!) such that
(a) X0 = S,
(b) X ! X+1 (and X = \0<X0 for a limit ordinal ), and
(c) X ! X only if X = X.
In Denition 1(c), the stoppingcondition: X ! X only if X = X
expresses the idea that no elements in X can be eliminated for further




. An IEP fXg for (S; c)




and X 6= X for all  < . Denition 1 does





each round of reduction since c
 
X
  X+1  X; in particular, it allows
for the elimination of no elements in some round of reduction: X+1 = X.
The following theorem asserts that, for any arbitrary set S and choice
rule c on S, there is always an iterated elimination process in Deni-
tion 1. Under Monotonicity, the iterated elimination procedure is order-
independent : that is, all IEPs yield a unique set of nal outcomes. Fur-
thermore, every IEP results in all xed-pointsof c and, thus, it preserves
all elements x = c (x).
Theorem 1. (a) For any problem (S; c), there exists a (fast) IEP on
(S;!). (b) Suppose that c satises Monotonicity. Then, the iterated elim-




 is an IEP
for (S; c), then X = [Z=c(Z)Z.
9
We would like to point out that, except for the ZF axioms, our proof of
the existence of iterated elimination procedure does not require the Axiom
of Choice. The proof improves, if applied to iterated strict dominance in
games, the existence proofs in Chen et al. (2007, 2015) which rely on either
the Axiom of Choice or the Well-Ordering Principle.
The iterated elimination procedure is in general order-dependent: it-
erated elimination processes in Denition 1 may generate di¤erent sets
of outcomes. For instance, some of the most prominent iterated elimina-
tion procedures such as iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies
(IEWDS) fail to be order independent. Under Monotonicity, Theorem 1(b)
asserts that the iterated elimination procedure must be order-independent.
While this result is simple, it is useful to determine the order indepen-
dence for many iterated elimination processes used in game theory, which
preserve Nash equilibria by Theorem 1(b). See, for example, Apts (2004)
related discussions on the order independence of various forms of iterated
dominance in nite games, Ritzbergers (2002) Theorem 5.1 for the order
independence of iterated strict dominance in the class of CC games (where
strategy sets are compact and payo¤ functions are continuous), and Chen
et al.s (2007) Theorem 1 for the order independence of iterated strict dom-
inance* in arbitrary games.
Nevertheless, iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies (IESDS)
fails to satisfy the property of monotonicity (because no element in a sin-
gleton of a strictly dominated strategy can be strictly dominated by using
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this dominated strategy). Monotonicity is not a necessary condition for
order independence, as illustrated by the example in Introduction. In par-
ticular, the monotonicity property seems to be an unnecessary requirement
for a circumstance that never occurs in performing the iterated elimination.
We o¤er a weaker version of monotonicity for order independence, which
we call monotonicity*: it requires the monotonicity property only along
the iterated reduction sequence starting at S. Let ! denote the indirect
reduction relation induced by !. That is, X ! Y i¤ there is a reduction
sequence fXg such thatX0 = X, X ! X+1 (andX = \0<X0 for






Monotonicity*. [S ! X ! Y ] ) [c (Y )  c (X)].
That is, the Monotonicity* property requires that, along a reduction se-
quence throughX to Y , choice sets should not be expansive i.e., no unde-
sirable alternative outside c (X) can be changed to a desirable one in c (Y )
during the phase of reduction: X ! Y . If we restrict our attention only
to the one-step-ahead reduction, we obtain a simpler and weaker version of
1-Monotonicity* : [S ! X ! Y ] ) [c (Y )  c (X)]. The central result of
this paper is that, under the weak condition of Monotonicity*, the iterated
elimination procedure is order-independent. Moreover, 1-Monotonicity* is
su¢ cient for order independence in the nite case.
Theorem 2. (a) Suppose that c satises Monotonicity*. Then, the iterated
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elimination procedure for the problem (S; c) is order-independent. (b) Let S
be a nite set. If c satises 1-Monotonicity*, then c satises Monotonicity*
and, thus, the iterated elimination procedure is order-independent.
Remark. Monotonicity implies Monotonicity* which in turn implies 1-
Monotonicity*. 1-Monotonicity* is closely related to the Aizerman prop-
erty used in the choice-theoretic literature: [c (X)  Y  X]) [c (Y )  c (X)];
see, e.g., Moulin (1985). In 1-Monotonicity*, we relax the premise of the
Aizerman property only for the set X resulting from a reduction sequence
starting at S. In Monotonicity*, we strengthen the premise of the Aizer-
man property by considering the indirect reduction relation! because the
iterated elimination procedure may use a transnite sequence of reduction
in innite sets.
The following example shows that, in the innite set case, 1-Monotonicity*
is not su¢ cient for order independence.
Example 1. Consider an innite set S = N [ f 1g. The choice rule c is
dened as: for subsets N  N,
c (N [	) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
NnminN if jN j > 1
N if jN j = 1
	 if N = ?
,
where 	 is f 1g or ?. In this example there are two IEPs which generate
di¤erent outcomes:
1. X0 = S, Xn = Nnf0; 1; :::; n  1g 8n 2 N, and XN = \n2NXn = ?.
2. eX0 = S, eXn = Snf0; 1; :::; n  1g 8n 2 N, and eXN = \n2N eXn = f 1g.
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The choice rule c satises 1-Monotonicity*. However, c fails to satisfy
Monotonicity* since S ! f 1g and f 1g = c (f 1g) 6 c (S) = Nnf0g.
(Note: \n2Nc
 eXn 6= c\n2N eXn.)
1.3 Applications in game theory
Consider an arbitrary (strategic) game:
G  (N; fSigi2N ; fuigi2N),
where N is an (in)nite set of players, Si is an (in)nite set of player is
strategies, and ui : i2N Si ! R is player is arbitrary payo¤ function. Let
S  i2NSi = SiS i. For X  S let Xi = fsi 2 Si : (si; x i) 2 Xg and
X i = fs i 2 S i : (xi; s i) 2 Xg. For game G, let c be a choice rule on
S and for X  S dene
DOM (X)  Xnc (X) .
We consider the abstract reduction system (S;!) for the choice problem
(S; c).
1.3.1 Finite games
Hereditarity Consider a nite game G = (N; fSigi2N ; fuigi2N). In -
nite games, along the lines of Gilboa et al.s (1990) approach, Apt (2011)
presented an easy-to-apply condition of hereditarity for order indepen-
dence; Apt (2011) demonstrated that many of order-independence results
for iterated elimination procedures in nite games can be obtained by check-
13
ing the hereditarity property. We state this condition in our choice-based
setting as follows: Let X; Y  S.
Hereditarity. [X ! Y ]) [(Y \DOM (X))  DOM (Y )].
That is, Hereditarity says if x is dominated but not eliminated (i.e., x 2
DOM (X)\Y ), then it is still dominated after eliminating some of the dom-
inated elements (i.e., x 2 DOM (Y )). For example, under the strict dom-
ination relation, a nite game satises Hereditarity because every strictly
dominated strategy in a nite game has an undominated dominator, re-
maining in any reduced game after eliminating some of the strictly domi-
nated strategies, which strictly dominates the former dominated strategy
in this reduced game. Since Hereditarity actually implies 1-Monotonicity*
(see the proof of Corollary 1), Apts (2011, Theorem 1) order-independence
result follows immediately from Theorem 2(b).8 Since the requirement of
1-Monotonicity* is only imposed on the elimination path, 1-Monotonicity*
does not imply hereditarity (see the example in the introduction).
Corollary 1. Suppose that G is a nite game. Under Hereditarity, the
iterated elimination procedure is order-independent.
1-CD* games Motivated by Jacksons (1992) idea of boundedness
that requires that strategies be eliminated only by undominated strate-
gies, Dufwenberg and Stegeman (2002) introduced a denition of games
8Apt (2011) considered the class of nite sequences of reduction under a variety of
dominance relations in nite games and showed this result by using Newmans (1942)
Lemma.
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closed under dominance (CD games)for the strict dominance and showed,
through an example, that IESDS can be order-dependent in CD games.
Roughly speaking, CD games satisfy the property that at any point in a
nite-step sequence of deletions, any dominated strategy has an undomi-
nated dominator. At a conceptual level, this denition of CD games does
not rule out the possibility of order dependence of an elimination procedure.
The following example shows this point.9
Example 2. Consider the two-person game:
y1 y2
x1 1; 1 0; 0
x2 1; 1 2; 1
The game is a CD game under the weak dominance because, in every
reduced game, any weakly dominated strategy is weakly dominated by a
weakly undominated strategy. However, the iterated weak dominance is
not order independent. At a conceptual level, the order independence of
iterated strict dominance should not be attributed to the CD property,
but due to the fact that Hereditarity holds for iterated strict dominance in
nite games.
Nevertheless, the strict domination relation in nite games satises a
stronger 1-CD* property that every strictly dominated strategy in a nite
game has an undominated dominator, remaining to be an undominated
9By the transitivity of weak dominance, any nite game is a CD game; see Jackson
(1992, p.763). This denition of CD games cannot be expected to solve the problem of
order dependence in nature.
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dominator in any reduced game after eliminating some of the strictly dom-
inated strategies, which strictly dominates the former dominated strategy
in this reduced game. In fact, if an abstract domination relation satises
Monotonicity like ones under rationalizability and the strict dominance* as
dened below, then CD implies this stronger 1-CD* property, which is suf-
cient for order independence of the iterated elimination procedure dened
by using reduced games because it implies Hereditarity.
We follow Jacksons (1992) idea of boundednessto introduce the no-
tion of 1-CD* games to solve the problem of order dependence under an ar-
bitrary domination relation. Consider a nite gameG  (N; fSigi2N ; fuigi2N).
For X  S = i2NSi, let X denote an abstract domination relation on S
given X. For proles x; y 2 S, y X x is interpreted to mean that y domi-
nates x conditionally on X; see also Luo (2001) for more discussions. For
instance, y X x can represent the strict domination relation: y strictly
dominates x given X, that is, y X x i¤ there exists i 2 N such that
ui (yi; z i) > ui (xi; z i) for all z i 2 X i. Dene c (X) = XnDOM(X),
where
DOM(X) = fx 2 X : y X x for some y 2 Xg .
For any X; Y  S, let
DOMY (X) = fx 2 X : y X x for some y 2 Y g .
Now consider the abstract reduction system (S;!) for the problem (S; c).
We say that game G (under an abstract domination relation X) is one-
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step-ahead-deletion closed under dominance* (1-CD*) if S ! X ! Y and
y X x for some y 2 X and x 2 Y imply that: there exists z 2 Y such
that z 6Y z Y x for all z 2 Y , i.e.,
[S ! X ! Y ]) (Y \DOM (X))  DOM c(Y ) (Y ) .
That is, at any stage in a sequence of deletions, any dominated element
surviving the one-step-ahead deletion has an undominated dominator which
continues dominating it at the end of the deletion. In other words, under an
abstract domination relation, any dominated strategy that is not eliminated
has an undominated dominator during the phase transition of one-step-
ahead deletion.10
Note that a 1-CD* game must be a CD game because the former also
satises the property: S ! X ! X and y X x for some x; y 2 X imply
that: there exists z 2 X such that z 6X z X x for all z 2 X, i.e.,
[S ! X] ) DOM (X) = DOM c(X) (X). Thus, the notion of 1-CD*
games can be viewed as a dynamicversion of CD games by extending
the CD concept to the one-step-ahead reduction transition. The notion of
1-CD* games can exclude problematic games with the problem of order
dependence; for instance, the game of Example 2 is not a 1-CD* game
under the weak domination relation since S ! X = fx1; x2g  fy1g and
10That is, a 1-CD* game has a boundednessproperty that there exists the undom-
inated dominator which is not eliminated in the one-step-ahead deletion. This property
is related to Gilboa, Kalai, and Zemels (1990) (GKZ) notion of reduction that requires
that the dominator is one which is not eliminated. Corollary 3 shows that, in 1-CD*
games, the GKZ elimination procedure is equivalent to the reduction procedure dis-
cussed in this paper. In a nite game, 1-CD* is equivalent to CD*, the proof is similar
to that of Theorem 2(b).
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(x2; y1) S (x1; y1) but (x2; y1) X (x1; y1). The following corollary asserts
that the iterated elimination procedure is order independent for any nite
1-CD* game.
Corollary 2. Suppose that G is a nite 1-CD* game. Then, the iterated
elimination procedure is order-independent.
Gilboa, Kalai and Zemel (1990) (GKZ) studied a variety of elimination
procedures and provide su¢ cient conditions for order independence. The
key requirement for the GKZ procedure is that for any element x that is
eliminated there exists an element y that dominates x and is not elim-
inated. More precisely, the GKZ procedure is an elimination procedure
on the abstract reduction system
 
S;!GKZ associated with an abstract
domination relation X , where, for subsets X; Y  S,
X !GKZ Y i¤ Y  X and XnY  DOMY (X) .
That is, X !GKZ Y i¤ every eliminated element x 2 XnY has a domi-
nator y 2 Y (i.e. x 2 DOMY (X)). Apparently, X !GKZ Y implies X
! Y , since DOMY (X)  DOM (X); the GKZ procedure can be viewed
as a special form of the iterated elimination procedure in Denition 1.
Moreover, if DOM (X)  DOM c(X) (X), X !GKZ Y i¤ X ! Y . The
following Corollary states that, in nite 1-CD* games, the iterated elimi-
nation procedure in Denition 1 is precisely the GKZ procedure, which is
an order-independent procedure as proved by GKZ.
Corollary 3. Suppose that G is a nite 1-CD* game. Then, the GKZ
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procedure is equivalent to the iterated elimination procedure in Denition 1
and, thus, the GKZ procedure is order independent.
Related literature We demonstrate how to apply our analysis of order
independence to some of the iterated elimination processes for nite games
discussed in the literature, including iterated strict dominance, iterated
weak dominance and rationalizability. For any subsetX of strategy proles,
we can dene the choice set c (X) in the following ways.
1. [strict dominance] c (X) = XnDOM (X) where11












 8x0 i 2 X ig.
That is, c (X) consists of all strategy proles in X where each player is
strategy is strictly dominated by no mixed strategy in(Xi). Since every
strictly dominated strategy xi in a nite game has an undominated dom-
inator, remaining in a reduced game after eliminating some of the strictly
dominated strategies, which strictly dominates xi in that reduced game,
(Y \DOM (X))  DOM (Y ) for c (X)  Y  X. Thus, Hereditarity
holds. By Corollary 1, IESDS is an order-independent procedure. (Under
the strict dominance relation, 1-CD* actually holds true, but Monotonic-
ity fails to be satised, e.g., c (x) = x =2 c (X) for x 2 Xnc (X).)
11We denote by (Xi) the probability space on Xi and by ui (i; x i) the expected
payo¤ of player i under a mixed strategy i 2 (X i).
19
2. [weak dominance] c (X) = XnDOM (X) where DOM (X) =


















for some x0 i 2 X ig.
That is, c (X) consists of all strategy proles in X where each player
is strategy is weakly dominated by no mixed strategy in (Xi). The
IEWDS procedure may not be order independent in general; see, e.g.,
Example 2.
3. [strict dominance*] c (X) = XnDOMS (X) where












 8x0 i 2 X ig.
That is, c (X) consists of all strategy proles in X where each player is
strategy is strictly dominated by no strategy in Si; see, e.g., Milgrom
and Roberts (1990), Ritzberger (2002) and Chen et al. (2007). Since
every strictly dominated strategy in a nite game has an undominated
dominator which strictly dominates that dominated strategy in each of
subgames,
 
Y \DOMS (X)  DOMS (Y ) for Y  X. Thus, c (Y ) 
c (X) if Y  X. That is, Monotonicity holds. By Theorem 1(b), The
IESDS* procedure is order independent and preserves Nash equilibria.
4. [pure-strategy dominance] c (X) = XnDOM (X) where DOM (X) =
fx 2 X : 9i 2 N 8Z i  X i 9si 2 Si s.t. ui (si ; z i)  ui (xi; z i)
8z i 2 Z i and ui (si ; z i) > ui (xi; z i) for some z i 2 Z ig.
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That is, c (X) consists of all strategy proles in X where each player
is strategy is undominated in the sense of Borgers (1994). Under the
pure-strategy dominance relation, since every dominated strategy in a
nite game is clearly dominated in each subgame, (Y \DOM (X)) 
DOM (Y ) for Y  X. Thus, Hereditarity holds. By Corollary 1, the
pure-strategy dominance is an order-independent reduced procedure.
5. [rationalizability] c (X) = X \BR (X) where12
BR (X) = fs 2 S : 8i 2 N 9i 2 (X i) s.t.
ui (si; i)  ui (s0i; i) 8s0i 2 Sig.
That is, c (X) consists of all elements in X where each player is strategy
is a best response to some probabilistic belief in(X i). Since BR (Y ) 
BR (X) for Y  X, c (Y )  c (X) if Y  X. That is, Monotonicity holds.
By Theorem 1(b), rationalizability is an order-independent elimination of
never best response strategies which preserves Nash equilibria.
6. [c-rationalizability]Ambrus (2006) proposed a solution concept of coali-
tional rationalizability (c-rationalizability) in nite games by an itera-
tive procedure of restrictions of strategies. The procedure is analogous
to iterative elimination of never best response strategies, but operates
on implicit agreements by coalitions. More specically, let X and Z be
product-form subsets of strategy proles. Z is a supported restriction by
coalition J  N given X if (i) Zj  Xj for j 2 J and Zi = Xi for i =2 J
12We denote by (X i) the probability space on X i and by ui (xi; i) the expected
payo¤ of player i under a probabilistic belief i 2 (X i).
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and (ii) for j 2 J , xj 2 XjnZj implies that
max
f j2(X j)
uj (xj; f j) < max
sj2Sj
uj (sj; g j) 8g j 2 (Z j) with g J j = f J j
where f J j and g
 J
 j are the marginal distributions of f j and g j over S J
respectively. Let F (X) be the set of all the supported restrictions given
X. We dene the choice rule c for c-rationalizability by
c (X) = \Z2F(X)Z.
Ambrus (2006) dened c-rationalizability by a (fast) iterated elimination
procedure associated with this choice rule c; that is, in each elimination
round the intersection of all supported restrictions is retained (see also
Ambrus (2009) and Luo and Yang (2012) for more discussions). Ambrus
(2006, Proposition 5) showed an order independence result, under the
restriction that each elimination round must be an intersection of some
supported restrictions. Since the choice rule c satises 1-Monotonicity*
(see Lemma 4 in Appendix), by Theorem 2(b), Ambruss (2006) notion of
c-rationalizability is an order-independent procedure, without the afore-
mentioned restriction.
7. [HS-weak dominance] c (X) = XnDOM (X) where






  ui  xi; x0 i 8x0 i 2 X ig.
That is, c (X) consists of all strategy proles in X where each player is
strategy is not weakly undominated in the sense of Hillas and Samet (2014,
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Denition 4). Under the HS-weak dominance relation, since every domi-
nated strategy in a nite game has an undominated dominator which dom-
inates that dominated strategy in each of subgames, (Y \DOM (X)) 
DOM (Y ) for c (X)  Y  X. That is, Hereditarity holds. By Corollary
1, the HS-weak dominance is an order-independent procedure; see Hillas
and Samets (2014) Proposition 2.
8. [IECFA] Asheim and Dufwenberg (2003) dened the concept of a fully
permissible set, which captures an idea of common certain beliefthat
each player avoids using a weakly dominated strategy, by an iterative
elimination of choice sets under full admissible consistency (IECFA)in
nite games. In a two-player game, the iterated elimination procedure can
be simply dened on  = 1  2 (instead of S), where i = 2Sinf?g.
For any nonempty  = 1  2  , dene c () = c1 (2)  c2 (1),
where
ci (j)  fQi 2 i : 9 (? 6=)Q  j s.t. Qi = SinDi (Q)g and
Di (Q) 

si 2 Si : 9xi 2 (Si) weakly dominates si on Sj or [Qj2Q Qj
	
.
As Asheim and Dufwenberg (2003) pointed out, Monotonicity holds for
the choice rule c. By Theorem 1(b), IECFA is an order independent
procedure.
9. [RBEU] Cubitt and Sugden (2011) o¤ered an iterative procedure of
reasoning-based expected utility procedure (RBEU) for solving nite
games. RBEU uses a sequence of accumulationand eliminationop-
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erations to categorize strategies as permissible and impermissible; some
strategies remain uncategorized when the procedure halts. Cubitt and
Sugden (2011) demonstrated that RBEU can delete more strategies than
IESDS, while avoiding the order dependence problem associated with
IEWDS. Formally, a sequence of categorizations fS (k)g1k=0 is inductively
dened as: (i) S (0)  (?;?) and (ii) for all k  1, S (k)  (S+ (k) ; S  (k))
such that, for all i 2 N ,
S+i (k) 






si 2 Si : 8 2 k 1, ui (s0i; ) > ui (si; ) for some s0i 2 Si
	
,
where k 1 = f 2 (S i) : 
 
S  i (k   1)

= 0 and  (s i) > 0 8s i 2
S+ i (k   1)g. Given a sequence fS (k)g1k=0, we can alternatively dene a
class of IEPs under the choice rule c (X) = Xn [k2fk0: XSnS i (k0)g S
 
i (k).
Apparently, Monotonicity holds for this choice rule c and, by Theorem
1(b), it generates an order-independent reduced procedure, which leads to
a unique set of nal outcomes by Cubitt and Sugdens (2011) Proposition
2.
10. [nice weak dominance] Let X denote a product set of S (i.e., X =
i2NXi  S). We say that player is strategy si 2 Si is nicely weakly
dominated (NWD) on X, if there exists si 2 Si such that for all x i 2
X i, either ui (si ; x i) > ui (si; x i) or u (s

i ; x i) = u (si; x i) ; and the
former inequality holds for some x i 2 X i.13 Dene:
13That is, si is weakly dominated by si and the game satises the transference of
decisionmaker indi¤erence (TDI) condition: whenever a player is indi¤erent between
two proles that di¤er only in the players strategy, that indi¤erence is transferred to
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c(X)  i2Nci(X)  i2N (XinDOMi(X)) where
DOMi (X) = fxi 2 Xi : xi is NWD on X by some xi 2 Xig .
That is, ci(X) consists of all player is strategies which are not nicely weakly
dominated in the sense of Marx and Swinkels (1997, Denition 2). Marx
and Swinkels (1997) showed that iterated elimination of nicely weakly dom-
inated strategies is outcomeorder independent. This choice rule c for the
nice weak dominance satises a variant of 1-Monotonicity* which gives rise
to the desirable order-independence result (see Appendix II: NWD).
1.3.2 Innite games
Hereditarity*: a full characterization Consider an innite game
G = (N; fSigi2N ; fuigi2N). It seems natural and necessary to account for
both nite and transnite sequences of deletions. We present a variant
form of hereditarityfor order independence in innite games.
Hereditarity*. [S ! X ! Y ]) [(Y \DOM (X))  DOM (Y )].
Hereditarity* is a property for the domination relation used in a game.
The following result shows that the Hereditarity* property provides a full
characterization for Monotonicity* in the context of a game. Therefore,
Hereditarity* provides an alternative su¢ cient condition for order inde-
pendence in innite games.
Theorem 3. Hereditarity* and Monotonicity* are equivalent. Under
the opponents as well.
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Hereditarity*, the iterated elimination procedure is order independent.
CD* games In innite games, restricted to iterated elimination of strictly
dominated strategies (IESDS), Dufwenberg and Stegeman (2002) wrote,
More surprising, ... requiring that strategies be eliminated only by undom-
inated strategies (a variation on Jacksons (1992) idea of boundedness)
does not solve the problem of order dependence ... We concluded that the
problems of IESDS in innite games are deeper than the possible nonex-
istence of the bestdominating strategy.The following example, taken
from Dufwenberg and Stegeman (2002), shows that the GKZ procedure
cannot solve the problems of order dependence in CD games.
Example 3. Consider a two-person game: G  (N; fSigi2N ; fuigi2N),
where N = f1; 2g, S1 = S2 = [0; 1]nf1=3g, and ui : Si  Sj 7! R for
i; j 2 N and i 6= j, dened by
ui(si; sj) = si(1  si   sj) if sj 2 Q,
ui(si; sj) = si(1  si   1=3) if sj =2 Q,
where Q denotes the set of rational numbers in [0; 1]. Dufwenberg and
Stegeman (2002, p.2017) showed that this game is a CD game. However,
the IESDS procedure fails to be order independent; for example, there
are two IESDS processes that generate di¤erent outcomes: Let ha; bi2 
[a; b]nf1=3g  [a; b]nf1=3g.
1. X0 = S = ha0; b0i2, Xn = han; bni2 (where an = (1  bn 1) =2 and
bn = (1  an 1) =2), and XN = \n2NXn = ?.
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2. eX0 = S, eXn = Xn[f(q; q)g for n 2 N, and eXN = \n2N eXn = f(q; q)g
(where q =2 Q).
Particularly, for all n 2 N, c
 eXn = Xn+1. Thus, ? = \n2Nc eXn +
c
 eXN = f(q; q)g. That is, this game lacks the continuity at the limit point
of deletions; the choice rule c is explosive at the limit point. In Example
1 in Section 2, the choice rule c also displays upward jumpsat the limit
point: \n2Nc
 eXn  c eXN. (Note: This game of Example 3 is a 1-CD*
game.)
In order to get rid of the problem of order dependence in games with
innite strategy sets, we need to introduce a stronger notion of CD* games.
We say that game G (under an abstract domination relation X) is closed
under dominance* (CD*) if S ! X ! Y and y X x for some y 2 X
and x 2 Y imply that: there exists z 2 Y such that z 6Y z Y x for all
z 2 Y , i.e., [S ! X ! Y ] ) (Y \DOM (X))  DOM c(Y ) (Y ). That
is, at any point in any valid sequence of deletions, any dominated element
surviving the deletion process has an undominated dominator at the end
point of the deletion which dominates it.
The following result asserts that, in the class of CD* games, there
is no problem of order dependence. In particular, the GKZ procedure
(by allowing an transnite sequence of elimination) is always order in-
dependent. Under the strict dominance relation, all compact and own-
uppersemicontinuous (COUSC) games are CD* and, hence, the IESDS
procedure in Denition 1 is well-dened and order independent.
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Corollary 4. (a) Suppose that G is a CD* game. Then, the GKZ procedure
is equivalent to the iterated elimination procedure in Denition 1 which is
order independent. (b) Under the strict dominance relation, any compact
and own-uppersemicontinuous game is a CD* game and, thus, the IESDS
procedure dened in Denition 1 exists and is order independent.
We have pointed out, in nite games, that the orginal denition of CD
games might be conceptually little relevant to the property of order inde-
pendence. We have thereby introduced a useful notion of CD* games for
solving the problem of order dependence in innite games. The denition of
CD* not only captures Jacksons (1992) idea of boundednessthat strate-
gies are eliminated only by undominated strategies, but also it is immune
from the problem of discontinuityat limit points as demonstrated in Ex-
amples 1 and 3. In CD* games, we have shown that the GKZ procedure
is an order-independent iterated elimination procedure. The main driving
force for order independence comes from the Hereditarity*/Monotonicity*
property exhibited by a CD* game. While the class of CD* games is ex-
clusive of all problematic games with the problem of order dependence,
it abounds under the strict dominance, including all compact and own-
uppersemicontinuous games. Consequently, the IESDS procedure in Def-
inition 1 is always well-dened and order independent in COUSC games.
(We would like to mention that Chen et al. (2007) presented an alternative
denition of IESDS* by setting c (X) = XnDOMS(X) and showed that
IESDS* is well-dened and order independent in innite games.)
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1.4 Concluding remarks
In innite games, Dufwenberg and Stegeman (2002) pointed out that the
notion of IESDS might be an ill-behaved order-dependent procedure, even
in the class of CD games where any dominated strategy has an undomi-
nated dominator, and they concluded that the problems of IESDS in innite
games are deeper than the possible nonexistence of the bestdominating
strategy. One major focus of this paper is to study various (transnitely) it-
erated elimination procedures in the innite case. We have shown a general
existence of iterated elimination procedure. Following Gilboa et al.s (1990)
pioneering work, we have identied a fairly weak condition of Monotonic-
ity* for the order independence on an abstract reduction system, which
is closely related to the Aizerman property used in the choice-theoretic
literature.
We have demonstrated that our approach is applicable to any form of
iterated elimination processes in arbitrary strategic games. In addition, we
have provided a full characterization of Monotonicity* by Hereditarity* in
(in)nite games. We have also introduced a useful and variant notion of
CD* games, including all compact and own-uppersemicontinuous (COUSC)
games, and shown that the GKZ procedure is an order-independent iterated
elimination procedure in CD* games. In particular, the IESDS procedure
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Table: Relationship between different conditions for order independenceFigure. 1. Relationship between di¤erent conditions for order
independence
We would like to point out that, except for the ZF axioms, the existence
of iterated elimination procedure does not require the Axiom of Choice or
the Well-Ordering Principle; this result improves the previous existence re-
sults of iterated elimination procedure in innite games (e.g., Arieli (2012),
Ritzberger (2002), Dufwenberg and Stegeman (2002) and Chen et al. (2007,
2015)). Our analysis of strategic games is completely topology-free and
with no measure-theoretic assumption on the structure of the game, and
it is applicable to any kind of iterated dominance in arbitrary games. Our
framework in this paper can also be used to analyze the order independence
of various forms of iterated elimination procedures in mixed extensions of
nite games or general preference models used in game theory (cf. Chen
et al. (2015)). Alternatively, we can dene c (X) = XnDOMS(X), which
consists of all the elements in X that are undominated by any element in
S. Our analysis in this paper is applicable to this alternative denition.
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To close this paper, we would like to point out some possible exten-
sions of this paper for future research. In this paper, we consider the order
independence in terms of strategy proles resulting from iterated elimina-
tion processes for games. Several papers discuss a slight variant of order
independence in terms of payo¤ outcomesin nite strategic games (see,
e.g., Marx and Swinkels (1997)) or in terms of outcomes of play in -
nite extensive games (see, e.g., Chen and Micali (2013) and Heifetz and
Perea (2015)). The extension of this paper to such a variant of order in-
dependence in innite games is an important subject for further research;
Appendix II is an attempt in this direction. As we have emphasized, in this
paper we focus on the existence and order independence of iterated elimi-
nation procedure. The exploration of iterated elimination procedures from
an epistemic perspective is also an intriguing topic worth further investi-
gation (see, e.g., Brandenburger et al. (2008)). Finally, Monotonicity* is
not necessary for order independence (see Example 4 in Appendix I) and it
is certainly interesting to explore the necessary and su¢ cient condition for
order independence of iterated elimination procedure in general situations.
Appendix I: Proofs & Example 4
Proof of Theorem 1. (a) By transnite recursion (see, e.g., Jech 2003,




2Ord (where Ord is the class of all ordi-
nals) by




, and X = \0<X0 for a limit ordinal . (1)
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By the Axiom Schema of Separation (see, e.g., Jech 2003, p.7),

X :  2 Ord	
is a set because it is a subclass of the power set of S. Suppose, to the
contrary, that X 6= X0 for any  6= 0, then there is a bijection from
X :  2 Ord	 to Ord. By the Axiom Schema of Replacement (see, e.g.,
Jech 2003, p.13), Ord is a set, contradicting the fact that Ord is not a




for some  2 Ord. Let
0 = inf

 2 Ord : X = X+1 = c  X	. Then the sequence X	
0
is a fast IEP on (S;!).
(b) Let Z = c (Z). Obviously, Z  X0. Assume, by induction, that
Z  X0 for all 0 < . By monotonicity, c (Z)  c  X0 for all 0 < .
Therefore, Z = c (Z)  X. That is, Z  X for all   . Therefore,




, X = [Z=c(Z)Z. 
To prove Theorem 2, we need the following three lemmas.
Lemma 1. If S ! X and S ! Y imply that there exists T such that
X ! T and Y ! T , then the iterated elimination procedure is order
independent.
Proof. Assume by absurdity that there are two IEPs: S ! X = c (X)
and S ! Y = c (Y ), but X 6= Y . Then there exists T such that X ! T
and Y ! T . Therefore, X = T = Y . A contradiction. 
Lemma 2. If c satises Monotonicity*, S ! X ! Y implies Y ! c (X).
Proof. Let S ! X ! Y . Since c satises Monotonicity*, c (Y )  c (X).
SinceX ! Y , c (Y )  c (X)  Y  X. By the denition of!, Y ! c (X).

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Lemma 3. Suppose S ! X via a reduction sequence X	
. Then




if c satises Monotonicity*.
Proof. Since c satises Monotonicity*, c (X)  c  X for all  < .





Proof of Theorem 2.14 (a) Let S ! X via a reduction sequence
X
	




. We say the








)if there exists an
 -diamond grid S	
;  such that
1. for all   , S0 = X and S0 = Y ;






That is, the diamond structure spreads over a grid of    fractals (cf.
Figure 2).
14Our proof is inspired by Gilboa et al.s (1990) idea for order independence of nite
reduction sequences. We show that, under Monotonicity*, any pair of transnite reduc-
tion sequences has a nice diamondproperty which gives rise to the order independence
result.
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Figure. 2. A grid of   fractals
Observe that: S ! X and S ! Y i¤ there exists an ordinal  such that
S ! X via a reduction sequence X	





. By Lemma 1, it su¢ ces to show that the diamond
property holds true. We show it by (transnite) induction on . If  = 1,
then S ! X and S ! Y . By Lemma 2, X ! c (S) and Y ! c (S). Now
assume that the diamond property holds for all  < . We distinguish two
cases.
Case 1:  is a limit ordinal. Dene S0  X and S  \<S
for all  <  and  6= 0. Since X = \<X, S0 = \<S0. By the
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induction hypothesis, for all  < , we have

S ! S(+1) 8 < , c  S  S(+1)  S 8 < 
) \<c  S  \<S(+1)  \<S
, \<c  S  S(+1)  S .
By Lemma 3, c
 
S
  \<c  S  S(+1)  S. Therefore, S !
S(+1) for all  < . (If  is a limit ordinal, S = \<S = \<\0<
S
0
= \0<\<S0 = \0<S0.) Dene S  \<S = \<\<










 = \< \< S = \<S.
Case 2:  is a successor ordinal. By the induction hypothesis, there











0  X and S(+1)  c  S( 1) (and S 
\0<S0 if  is a limit ordinal) for all    1. SinceX 1 ! X, by the
induction hypothesis, S ! S( 1)0 ! S0 and S ! S( 1)0 ! S( 1)1.
By Lemma 2, S0 ! S1 and S( 1)1 ! S1. Again by induction on
   1, we have S ! S(+1) for all    1 and S( 1) ! S for









 for any      1 are reduction









 for any      1 is a reduction sequence. That is, there










Therefore, the diamond property holds.
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(b) Consider S ! X ! Y . By Theorem 2(a), it su¢ ces to check
c (Y )  c (X). Since S is a nite set, there exists a natural number N such
that X ! Y via a nite reduction sequence fXngnN (with Xn 1 6= Xn
for all n  N). By 1-Monotonicity*, c (X1)  c (X0) = c (X). Assume
inductively that c (Xn 1)  c (X) for all n  N . Since S ! Xn 1 ! Xn,
c (Xn)  c (Xn 1)  c (X) by 1-Monotonicity*. Thus, c (Y ) = c  XN 
c (X). 
Proof of Corollary 1. Suppose that X ! Y . That is, c(X)  Y  X.
By Hereditarity, we have
[(Y \DOM (X))  DOM (Y )], [Y n (Y \DOM (X))  Y nDOM (Y )]
, [Y nDOM (X)  Y nDOM (Y )]
) [XnDOM (X)  Y nDOM (Y )] .
That is, c (Y )  c (X) if X ! Y . By Theorem 2(b), the iterated elimina-
tion procedure for G is order-independent. 
Proof of Corollary 2. Suppose that S ! X ! Y . Since X ! Y ,
c (X)  Y  X. SinceG is a 1-CD* game, Y \DOM(X)  DOM c(Y )(Y ) 
DOM(Y ). By the proof of Corollary 1, we obtain that S ! X ! Y im-
plies c (Y )  c (X). By Theorem 2(b), the iterated elimination procedure
for G is order independent. 
Proof of Corollary 3. Suppose that S ! X ! Y . Then c (X)  Y  X.
Since G is 1-CD* and S ! X ! X, DOM (X) = DOM c(X) (X). Thus,
36
DOM (X) = DOMY (X) = DOM c(X) (X). Therefore, we obtain
[X ! Y ] , [Y  X and XnY  DOM (X)]
, Y  X and XnY  DOMY (X)
, X !GKZ Y  .
That is, for any nite 1-CD* game, the GKZ procedure is equivalent to the
iterated elimination procedure in Denition 1. By Corollary 2, the GKZ
procedure is order independent. 
Lemma 4. The choice rule c for c-rationalizability satises 1-Monotonicity*.
Proof of Lemma 4. Let X &J Z denote supported restriction Z by
coalition J given X. Consider X ! Y . Then X  Y  c (X) =
\Z2F(X)Z 6= ? by Ambruss (2006) Proposition 1. Since Y \ Z  Y \
c (X) 6= ? for Z 2 F (X), by Ambruss (2006) Lemmas 1 and 2, Y &J
(Y \ Z). Then Y \ Z 2 F (Y ) for all Z in F (X). Thus, c (Y ) =
\Z2F(Y )Z  \Z2F(X) (Y \ Z)  \Z2F(X)Z = c (X). 
Proof of Theorem 3. Suppose S ! X ! Y . Then Y  X. Thus, we
have
[(Y \DOM (X))  DOM (Y )], [Y n (Y \DOM (X))  Y nDOM (Y )]
, [Y nDOM (X)  Y nDOM (Y )]
, [XnDOM (X)  Y nDOM (Y )] .
That is, (Y \DOM (X))  DOM (Y ) i¤ c (X)  c (Y ). Therefore, Hered-
itarity* and Monotonicity* are equivalent. By Theorem 2(a), Hereditarity*
37
implies that the iterated elimination procedure is order independent. 
Proof of Corollary 4. (a) Since any CD* game is 1-CD*, by Corol-
lary 3, the GKZ procedure is equivalent to the iterated elimination pro-
cedure in Denition 1. Suppose S ! X ! Y . Since G is a CD*
game, (Y \DOM(X))  DOM c(Y )(Y )  DOM(Y ). That is, Heredi-
tarity* holds. By Theorem 3, the GKZ procedure is order independent.
(b) Suppose that S ! X ! Y via a reduction sequence fXg. Let
y X x for some y 2 X and x 2 Y . Then, 9i 2 N such that ui (yi; x i) >
ui (xi; x i) for all x i 2 X i. Since G is a COUSC game, by the proof
of Dufwenberg and Stegemans (2002) Lemma, 9z 2 S such that, for all












and (ii) uj(zj ; x j)  uj (sj; x j) for
all j 2 N and all sj 2 Sj. Since x 2 Y  X, z 2 X for all  < . Thus,
z 2 \<X = Y . By (i) and (ii), z Y x and z 2 c (Y ). Therefore,
(Y \DOM(X))  DOM c(Y )(Y ), i.e., G is a CD* game. By Theorem 1(a)
and Corollary 4(a), the IESDS procedure dened in Denition 1 exists and
is order independent in COUSC games. 
Example 4 [Monotonicity* is not necessary for order indepen-
dence]. Consider S = fx; y; zg with the following choice function c (we
abuse notation by writing, for example, xy instead of fx; yg):
X  S xyz xy xz yz x y z
c (X) x x z z ? ? ?
Any IEP leads to ?. But, S ! xz fails to imply c (xz)  c (S).
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Appendix II: NWD
In this appendix, we o¤er an alternative proof of Marx and Swinkelss
(1997) result on the outcome order independence for nice weak domi-
nance (NWD).
Consider a nite game G = (N; fSigi2N ; fuigi2N). Let X = i2NXi 
S. A snapshot of X is dened as a game (N; figi2N ; fvigi2N) such that,
for all i 2 N , there are surjections ei : Xi 7! i satisfying for all  2 ,
v () = u (x) 8x 2 e 1(), where  = i2Ni, e(x) = (ei(xi))i2N and
e 1() = fx 2 X : e(x) = g. Denote X  Y if they have a common
snapshot.
Claim NWD. For any nite game G, iterated elimination of nicely weakly
dominated strategies are outcome order independent i.e., if fXg and
fY g0 are two nite IEPs of product sets of S, then X  Y 0.
Lemma NWD. (a) X  X 0 ) c(X)  c(X 0). (b) X ! Y ) Y ! Z for
some Z  c(X) (and Z  c(Y )). (c) Let [X]! [Y ] denote X 0 ! Y 0 for
some X 0  X and Y 0  Y . Then [X]! [Y ]) [Y ]! [c(X)].
Proof of Lemma NWD. (a) Suppose that (N; figi2N ; fvigi2N) is a com-
mon snapshot of X and X 0 (via the corresponding surjections e and e0).
Then, for all  2 , e 1i (i)  DOMi(X), i 2 DOMi(), e0 1i (i) 
DOMi(X
0) 8i 2 N . Thus, for all i 2 N , ci(X) = [i2ci()e 1i (i) and
ci(X
0) = [i2ci()e0 1i (i). Therefore, c(X) and c(X 0) have a common
snapshot (N; fci()gi2N ; fvigi2N) by the (restricted) surjections ejc(X) and
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e0jc(X0), respectively. That is, c(X)  c(X 0).
(b) Let Z = i2N (ci(X) [ ci(Y )). Since X ! Y , c(X)  Y  X.
So c(Y )  Z  Y , i.e., Y ! Z. It remains to show Z  c(X). Let
zi 2 ci(Y )nci(X). Then, zi is NWD on X by some ezi 2 Xi and u (zi; y i) =
u (ezi; y i) 8y i 2 Y i  X i. Since Z  Y , u (zi; z i) = u (ezi; z i) 8z i 2
Z i. By niteness of X and transitivity of NWD, there exists ezi 2 ci(X)
such that u (zi; z i) = u (ezi; z i) 8z i 2 Z i. Therefore, Z has a snapshot
(N; fci(X)gi2N ; fuigi2N) thorough the surjection ei : Zi 7! ci(X) such that
ei (zi) =
8>><>>:
zi; if zi 2 ci(X)
ezi; if zi 2 ci(Y )nci(X) .
Hence, Z  c(X). By construction of Z, c(Y )  Z  c(X).
(c) Suppose [X]! [Y ]. Then, there existX 0  X and Y 0  Y such that
X 0 ! Y 0. By (b), Y 0 ! Z 0 for some Z 0  c(X 0). By (a), c(X)  c(X 0).
Therefore, [Y ]! [c(X)]. 
Proof of Claim NWD.Without loss of generality, assume that fXg







! Y +1 for all  < . Similarly to the proof of Theorem 2(a),















2 An indistinguishability result on extensive
form rationalizability under general pref-
erences
2.1 Introduction
The game-theoretic solution concept of rationalizability, proposed by Bern-
heim (1984) and Pearce (1984), is logical implication of common knowledge
of rationality in the standard expected utility. Pearce (1984) also put for-
ward the notion of extensive form rationalizability (EFR) as an extension
to extensive games. Roughly speaking, EFR strategies are those surviv-
ing a process of iterated elimination procedure. In each step, all strategies
that are never sequentially-best responses are eliminated. The proce-
dure stops when no such strategy exists. Battigalli (1997) pointed out that
EFR can be characterized as the sequential rationality to a hierarchies of
beliefs systems which conform to the best rationalizable principle: Players
beliefs conditional upon observing a history must be consistent with the
highest degree of strategic sophisticationof their opponents. The best-
rationalization principle is also related to the epistemic condition of strong
belief in rationality(Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 2002). In this sense, EFR
fundamentally di¤ers from the notion of backward induction (BI) whose
epistemic foundation is rationality and common belief of future rationality
(Perea, 2014). Indeed, as the example in the next section suggests, EFR
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and BI might predict di¤erent strategies even in generic1 perfect infor-
mation (PI) games. However, as pointed out by Reny (1992), Battigalli
(1997) and Heifetz and Perea (2015), in generic PI games, BI and EFR
yield the same terminal node. Since EFR formalizes a fashion of forward
induction reasoning: A player should use all information she acquired
about her opponentspast behavior in order to improve her prediction of
their future, simultaneous, and past (unobserved) behavior, relying on the
assumption that they are rational. (Battigalli, 1997, p.41)This result is
of fundamental signicance. As an outside observer, one only observes the
realization of the actual outcome or terminal node after the play of the
game. The equivalence result, in terms of outcomes, implies that it is im-
possible to tell whether playersunderlying reasoning procedures conform
to forward induction or backward induction, since both yield exactly the
same observation.2
Pearces notion of EFR presumes Bayesian rationality: each player
chooses a strategy that maximizes the subjective expected utility (SEU)
axiomatized by Savage (1954). However, the Ellsberg Paradox and related
experimental evidences cast a doubt on the SEU model. Namely, decision
makers usually have ambiguity aversion concerns which cannot be captured
by the SEU model. Many generalizations of the SEU model are motivated
then to relax Bayesian rationality. To name a few, for example, ordinal
expected utility, probabilistically sophisticated preferences, Choquet ex-
1Roughly speaking, genericmeans for each player, payo¤s are all di¤erent among
di¤erent terminal nodes.
2See also Heifetz and Perea (2015) for more discussions on this issue.
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pected utility theory and the multi-priors model. It is then meaningful to
characterize EFR in a general preference model. Moreover, it is also inter-
esting to examine whether the outcome equivalence result still holds in a
broad sense. This paper thus aims to study these two questions.
Epstein and Wang (1996) o¤ered a unied approach to study decision
makersrational strategic behavior under quite general preference setting
(regular preference model). Their approach is applicable to study vari-
ous notions of solution concepts in game theory. For example, Epstein
(1997) extended rationalizability to general preference models. Epstein and
Wangs (1996) approach is virtually static and might not be directly applied
to study the notion of EFR in the dynamic setting of extensive games. This
paper then extends Epstein and Wangs (1996) approach and formulates
a model of conditional preferencewhich is applicable to EFR. Roughly
speaking, each player holds a conditional preference system which species
a conditional preference at each of his/her own information set. A model
of conditional preferencethus is a collection of admissible conditional pref-
erence systems of all players. The behavioral assumption embedded in the
notion of conditional preference systems is the consequentialism. That is,
conditioned on an information set h, strategic choices at information sets
incompatible with h are irrelevant for the conditional preference at h.3
Throughout this paper, only a rather weak condition, constant monotonic-
ity (CM), is imposed on the preference model. Roughly speaking, it only
3The empirical study by Dominiak et al. (2012) show that more subjects act in
line with consequentialism than with dynamic consistency and that this result is even
stronger among ambiguity averse subjects.
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requires that a constant act a with payo¤ a must be strictly preferred to
another constant act b with payo¤ b whenever a > b. In games situation,
it implies that a strategy is strictly preferred to another strategy if the for-
mer strategy assures a constant payo¤ strictly higher than the latter one
does. On the other hand, CM is silent on the preference order of strate-
gies with payo¤ uncertainties. Note that CM preferences might not have
utility representations and Epsteins (1997) regular preferences satisfy CM.
Therefore, preference models considered in this paper is rather general.
One main result in this paper shows that in generic PI games, for any
model of conditional preferences which admits all SEU preferences (consis-
tent with Bayesian updating) and satises CM, the EFR strategy proles
yield the backward induction outcome (Theorem 1). That is, the outcome
equivalence result in the literature remains true for a broad class of pref-
erence models. This result has rich implications. On the one hand, one
may interpret it as an indistinguishable result. From an outside observers
point of view, neither strategy choices nor the preferences of players can be
observed. The dynamic version of three-color Ellsberg experiment, viewed
as a single-person game, shows that di¤erent preferences may yield di¤er-
ent observable implications. However, in generic PI games, EFR in a class
of very general preference models yields the same set of outcomes of SEU
preferences. The research line of indistinguishability/distinguishability ap-
peals its signicance in the literature: Bergemann and Morris (2009) ap-
plied strategic distinguishability to robust virtual implementation. On
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the other hand, the notion of EFR captures forward induction arguments
which rene equilibrium concepts by restricting beliefs on o¤-equilibrium
path (see Battigalli (1997); Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002)). Theorem 1
implies that these renements have no impact on behavior along equilib-
rium path for generic PI games, and the strategic implication of forward
induction and backward induction coincides, i.e., backward induction rea-
soning and forward induction reasoning are also observationally indistin-
guishable. One may also see the backward induction outcome as a robust
implication of EFR under general model of conditional preferences. Since
CM condition is rather weak, the result covers all preference models dis-
cussed in the literature, e.g., the probabilistic sophistication model, the
multi-priors model, the Choquet expected utility model, the ordinal ex-
pected utility model, the lexicographic preference model, and the strongly
monotonicpreference model (see Chen and Luo, 2012). Theorem 1 can be
regarded as a generalization to Battigallis (1997) Theorem 4. Battigallis
(1997) proof, based on properties of Kohlberg and Mertens(1986) fully
stable sets, can not be directly adapted to general preferences. We gen-
eralize the result by investigating two crutial properties of EFR. The rst
one regards the dominance solvabilityof EFR. We show that in generic
PI games, EFR yields a unique terminal node under any preference model
satifying CM. (See Lemma 1 in appendix.) That is, CM is su¢ cient to
dominance solvability. This su¢ cient condition might be the weakest one
since CM is the weakest requirement for rational preferences as far as we
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know. The second one says that if the preference model admits SEU model,
then EFR outcomes under such model include the one under SEU model.
(Lemma 2 in appendix.) This result is implied from the outcome order
independenceof EFR under SEU model shown by Chen and Micali (2013)
and Luo et al. (2016).
Another main result shows that if the model admits all CM prefer-
ences, then the elimination procedure associated with EFR coincides with
the backward iterated dominance procedure (Theorem 2). That is, under
the largestmodel of CM preferences, the procedure to characterize EFR
is exactly the one inspired by backward induction reasoning. As mentioned
earlier, EFR and BI are conceptually di¤erent and have di¤erent implica-
tions of strategic choice for players. Nevertheless, this result shows that
the conict between those two solution concepts could be mitigated if we
enlarge the underlying preference model.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, an illustrative
example demonstrates the main results in this paper. Section 3 sets up the
analytical framework. Section 4 presents the main theorems. Section 5
dicusses the non-generic case. Section 6 o¤ers concluding remarks. To
facilitate reading, all the proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2.2 An illustrative example
The following two-person centipede game, due to game  3 in Battigalli
(1997), demonstrates the main results in this paper for generic PI games
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(where generic means that no same payo¤ is assigned to two distinct ter-
minal nodes for any player).
Fig. 1. A two-person game
Apparently, (S1S3; S2S4) is the unique BI strategy prole. Pearces
notion of EFR, or EFR with respect to SEU model, is the set of strategy
proles surviving iteratively eliminating never sequential best repliesin
the following way. In the rst step, C2C4 is no better response than C2S4
conditioned on h4; C1S3 is no better response than S1S3 conditioned on
h1 because by playing C1S3, player 1 either gets a payo¤ 1 or 2 while
S1S3 secures the payo¤ 3. In the second step, player 2 considers that if
h2 is reached by a rational play, then it must be the case that player
1 chose C1C3. Therefore, C2S4 becomes player 2s only rational play. In
the third step, C1C3 is no better response than S1S3 conditioned on h1.
Consequently, EFR set is fS1S3; S1C3g  fC2S4g which predicts the same
terminal node (S1) as the BI does. Note that the elimination procedure
only involves strict dominance relation between pure strategies conditioned
on reachable information sets. Thus EFR under the strongly monotonic
preference model is exactly the same as that under SEU model.
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Now consider a model which admits all CM preferences. Consequently,
a strategy is strictly preferred to another strategy if both strategies con-
ditionallyassure constant payo¤s and the former payo¤ is strictly higher
than the latter one, and no specic preference ordering is primitively as-
sumed once there is uncertainty involved (at the conditional). Particularly,
in the rst step, C1S3 could be an optimal reply to a CM preference which
exhibits extremely ambiguity-seeking behavior. It is easy to see that un-
der CM preference model, C2C4;C1C3;C1S3 are consecutively eliminated
and left with the EFR set fS1S3; S1C3g  fS2S4; S2C4g whose outcome is
the same as the BI outcome. Moreover, the elimination procedure exactly
matches with the backward iterated dominance procedure: In each step, if
backward induction deletes action a at node h, then delete all the strategies
reaching h and choosing a (see, e.g., Osborne and Rubinstein, page 108).
Note that EFR set under SEU model is not a subset of that under CM
model. It means that EFR is not monotone in preference model. The
absence of monotonicity is related the order dependent issue of EFR.
Suppose in each step along the EFR procedure, instead of eliminating all
of the never sequential best replies, we only eliminate some of them and
stops when there is no more never sequential best repliesleft. This corre-
sponds to a new elimination order. Di¤erent elimination orders may deliver
di¤erent nal sets. In particular, in the above example, the EFR procedure
under CMmodel can be regarded as an alternative eliminition order of EFR
under SEU model. Due to such ill behavior, the relationship between EFR
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under di¤erent preference model is unclear and thus it is di¢ cult to nd
a straightforward proof for the indistinguishability result. However, EFR
procedure under SEU model is outcome order independentin the sense
that di¤erent eliminition order yields the same set of terminal nodes. This
property provides us a short cut to relate EFR outcomes among di¤erent
preference models. In fact, this property plays an important role in our
proof.
2.3 Set-up
Consider a (nite) extensive form with perfect recall:4
  = (N; V; fHigi2N ; fAhgh2[i2NHi),
where N = f1; 2;    ; ng is the set of players, V is the set of nodes, Ah
is the set of actions available at information set h and Hi is the set of
information sets for player i 2 N . Let Z  V denote the set of terminal
nodes. A payo¤ function for player i is a function ui : Z ! R. The game
 (u) is specied by the extensive form   and the payo¤s u  (ui)i2N .5
A (pure) strategy of player i is a function that assigns an action in
Ah to each information set h 2 Hi. Let Si denote the set of strategies of
player i and S  i2NSi  Si  S i denote the set of strategy proles.
4Since the formal description of an extensive form is by now standard (see, for in-
stance, Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Osborne and Rubinstein (1994)), we here include
the necessary notation only. We note that our approach in this paper can be easily
extend to games with nature moves.
5To make the paper easy to read, we specify numerical payo¤s to terminal nodes.
However, it is not neccessary to do so. The analysis and main results in this paper apply
as long as players are endowed with preference orderings over terminal nodes.
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For a strategy prole s  (si)i2N  (si; s i) 2 S, let g (s) denote the
corresponding terminal node realized.
Consider an information set h of player i. A pure strategy prole s
reaches h if it reaches some node in h. The set of all proles reaching h
is denoted by S (h), whose projections on Si and S i are denoted by Si(h)
and S i(h) respectively. We say si (respectively s i) reaches h if si 2 Si(h)
(respectively s i 2 S i(h)). By perfect recall, there is a unique sequence
of actions of player i which leads to h, hence, S(h) = Si(h) S i(h).
From the decision theory point of view, each player is a decision maker
who deals with opponentsstrategic uncertainty and coordinates his/her
sequential moves in the extensive game situation. The uncertainty par-
tially resolves as the play of the game progresses. Specically, once an
information set h 2 Hi is realized and player i is about to move therein,
he/she concludes that none of the strategy proles which exclude h could
be possibly played. That is, player i considers that h must be reachable by
opponentsmoves. Accordingly, player i restricts the opponentsstrategic
uncertainty to the set S i(h). Each player is endowed with a conditional
preference system (cps) to account for this process of uncertainty resolution.
Formally, player i holds a cps i (h)h2Hi such that for all h 2 Hi, the
complement of S(h) is null in the sense of Savage (1954) for the conditional
preference h.6 That is, payo¤s on those terminal nodes incompatible with
h are irrelevant for the conditional preference h. One may refer to this
68si; s0i; ti; t0i 2 Si, if ui (g (si; s i)) = ui (g (s0i; s i)) and ui (g (ti; s i)) =
ui (g (t
0
i; s i)) 8s i 2 S i(h), then si 0h ti , s0i h t0i.
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formulation as a form of consequentialism. It embodies the idea that a
preference conditional on an event should not depend on the consequences
outside of that event. For more discussions, see, for example, Epstein and
Le Breton (1993), Ghirardato (2002) and Hanany and Klibano¤ (2007).
Conditional preference systems generalize the conditional probability sys-
tems introduced by Renyi (1992).
Suppose player i holds a working hypothesiswhich states that strat-
egy proles being played are conformed to a subset S 0  S. If the realiza-
tion of h 2 Hi does not falsify this hypothesis, i.e., S 0\S(h) 6= ;, then at h,
player i will naturally maintain the hypothesis which provides additional
information. Otherwise, player i cannot maintain both consequentialism
and the working hypothesis. Since consequentialism is primitively assumed
in this paper, player i must abandon the latter in counterfactual cases. We
say player is cps i knows a subset S 0  S if he/she is sure of S 0 whenever
S 0 is not falsied. Formally, we adopts the following denition:
Denition 1. Player is cps i knows S 0  S if 8h 2 Hi, the complement
of S 0 \ S(h) is Savage-null for hwhenever S 0 \ S(h) 6= ;.
This knowledge notion in this paper is in the same spirit of the strong
belief operator in Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) and generalizes it to
general preferences.
Consider a model of conditional preferencesP(  (u))  fPi()gi2N on
  (u), where Pi() is dened for any subset in product form S 0 = i2NS 0i 
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S, and Pi(S 0) is interpreted as is admissible cps which know S 0.7 Therefore,
for every collection of cps in fPi(S 0)gi2N , the reduced gameS 0 serves as
a common working hypothesis.
Denition 2. The constantly monotone model PCM () is dened as fol-
lows. For every S 0 = i2NS 0i  S, a cps (h)h2Hi 2 PCMi (S 0) if and only
if it knows S 0 and for all h 2 Hi, it satises constant monotonicity (CM):
8si; s0i 2 Si,
[8s i 2 S i (h) , ui (g (si; s i)) = r > r0 = ui (g (s0i; s i))]) [si h s0i].
That is, CM requires that a strategy is strictly preferred to another strategy
if the former strategy assures a constant payo¤ strictly higher than the
latter one does. The restriction takes e¤ect only under the case without
any payo¤uncertainty. Note that a CM preference is rather weak and might
not have a utility representation. Any preference which violates CM would
be considered as either trivial or irrational. In this sense, CM is self-evident
and therefore no essential behavioral assumption, except consequentialism,
is imposed on preferences throughout this paper. The following examples
demonstrate that the analytical framework in this paper can be applied
to games where the players have di¤erent kinds of preferences, including
the standard SEU model (with Bayesian updating) and regular preference
7Since strategic implications are mainly concerns in this paper, for simplicity, we
adopt a simple version of preference model here. We note that we can start from the
state space and extend Epstein and Wangs (1996) way to construct a model of con-
ditional preference from the primitive state space in dynamic setting. An advantage
of the denition used in this paper is that it permits sharp results that can be inter-
preted as reecting exclusively the more liberal meaning for the behavior in various
game situations. (see Chen et al. (2016)) Note that, throughout this paper, no utility
representation is assumed.
52
model as special cases. It is also applicable to model strategic behavior
such as interactive ambiguity in extensive games.8
Example 1. The SEU model, denoted as PSEU (), is dened through SEU
representation based on conditional probability systems (see Renyi (1992)).
For every S 0 = i2NS 0i  S, say   (h)h2Hi is a conditional probability
system over S 0 i if conditions (i)-(iii) hold for all h; h
0 2 Hi:
(i) h is a probability distribution on S i(h);
(ii) h
 
S 0 i \ S i(h)

= 1 whenever S 0 i \ S i(h) 6= ;;













s i2S0 iui (g (si; s i))h (s i) , 8si 2 Si,
for some conditional probability system  over S 0 i.
Example 2. The regular preference model, denoted as PReg (), is dened
as follows. Conditioned on every h 2 Hi, each strategy si can be identied
with an act si () jh on S i (h). Formally, 8s i 2 S i (h), si () jh maps s i




and only if it knows S 0 and for all h 2 Hi, there exists a regular preference
8See Ahn (2007) and Kajii (2005) for more discussions.
9Condition (iii) says that if the information set h0 follows h, then h0 is updated from
h by Bayes rule.
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<hon S i (h) (see Epstein 1997, pp.6-7) such that si h s0i , si () jh <h
s0i () jh, 8si; s0i 2 Si.
Both SEU model and regular preference model satisfy CM and thus are
submodels of PCM ().
2.4 EFR and indistinguishability
Bayesian rationality is the usual behavioral assumption made in the lit-
erature; that is, each player forms a prior probability distribution over
opponentsplay and chooses a strategy to maximize the corresponding ex-
pected utility. In the dynamic counterpart, a Bayesian-rational player is
assumed to choose a strategy which is a sequential best reply with respect
to some conditional probability systems. The model of conditional pref-
erence in this paper considerably relaxes the behavioral assumption and
might accommodate dynamic Ellsberg paradox. The following denition is
the sequential rationalitycondition adopted in this paper for an arbitrary
model of conditional preference.
Denition 3. Given h  (u) ;P ()i and S 0 = i2NS 0i  S, si 2 Si is a P-
best reply on S 0 if there exists a cps i2 Pi (S 0) such that the following
condition holds: 8h 2 Hi reached by si, si h s0i for all s0i 2 Si(h) \ S 0i.
That is, given a hypothetical reduced gameS 0, si is P-best reply on
S 0 if it can be supported by somei, which knows S 0, in the following sense:
si must be the most preferred strategy conditioned on every information set
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not precluded by itself, compared to all the other strategies in the reduced
game which reach that information set. Denote ri(Pi (S 0)) as the set of all
P-best replies on S 0 for player i and denote r(P (S 0))  i2Nri(Pi (S 0)).
The following denition extends Pearces notion of EFR to arbitrary model
of conditional preferences.
Denition 4. Given h  (u) ;P ()i, let S0 = S: Dene S1; :::; Sn+1 induc-
tively as Sn+1 = Sn\r(P (Sn)), then S1 = \n0Sn is the set of P-extensive
form rationalizable (P-EFR) strategy proles.
That is, after iteratively eliminating never P-best replies, the set left is
P-EFR. PSEU -EFR characterizes EFR in Pearce (1984).
Following Battigalli (1997), say   (u) is without relevant ties if 8i 2 N ,
8si; s0i 2 Si and 8s i 2 S i,
g(si; s i) 6= g(s0i; s i)) ui (g(si; s i)) 6= ui (g(s0i; s i)) .
In the above denition, the terminal nodes g(si; s i) and g(s0i; s i) (if
di¤erent) are called relevant terminal nodes for player i. Without relevant
ties means that there can not be payo¤ ties at relevant terminal nodes for
player i.
Theorem 1. Given h  (u) ;P ()i, if   (u) is a perfect information game
without relevant ties and PSEU ()  P ()  PCM (), then the outcome of
P-EFR strategies ( g (P-EFR)) is unique, which is the same as the backward
induction outcome.
Theorem 1 generalizes Battigallis (1997) Theorem 4 whose proof uses
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some properties of Kohlberg and Mertens(1986) fully stable sets. The
proof for Theorem 1 in this paper relies on two results. The rst one states
that for any model of conditional preference P ()  PCM (), the set of
P-EFR strategy proles reaches a unique terminal node. (See Lemma 1 in
appendix.) The second one is the outcome order independenceof PSEU -
EFR, i.e., all iterative elimination orders of never PSEU -best replies reaches
the same set of terminal nodes, a result shown by Chen and Micali (2013).
P-EFR is a special elimination order in the sense that all never P-best
replies are eliminated in each step. An arbitrary elimination order would
be eliminating some of the never P-best replies in each step and it stops
when there is no never P-best reply left. (See Denition and Lemma 2 in
appendix.)
Remark. Accroding to proofs in the appendix, Theorem 1 can be further
strengthened to arbitrary elimination orders. Formally speaking: Given
h  (u) ;P ()i, if   (u) is a PI game without relevant ties and PSEU () 
P ()  PCM (), then for an aribrary elimination order of never P-best
replies, the survived set yields the unique backward induction outcome.
Theorem 1 can be interpreted as an indistinguishable result: EFR
strategic behavior under a class of very general preference models is obser-
vationally indistinguishable from that under the SEU model. Furthermore,
base on the observed play of the game, one can not distinguish players
using EFR reasoning process from those using reasoning process of back-
ward induction. Note that without relevant ties is a generic condition, the
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indistinguishability thus generically holds for PI games. Chen and Luo
(2012) showed an indistinguishable result for compact Hausdo¤ strategic
game under concave like condition. It is worth to note that the result
in this paper is topological free. Lo (2000) provided an indistinguishability
result to all the models of preference that satisfy Savages axiom P3, which
is a form of monotonicity. The CM condition in this paper is even weaker




  (u) ;PCM (), if   (u) is a perfect information
game without ties10, then PCM -EFR is the same as the set survives back-
ward iterated dominance procedure.
As demonstrated in the illustrative example in section 2, S1S3 is se-
quential rationalif and only if S1C3 is because both yield the outcome S1
regardless of the strategic choice of player 2. Therefore, EFR is conceptu-
ally not possible to deliver the BI strategy prole. However, Theorem 2
draws a connection between PCM -EFR and the backward iterated domi-
nance procedure. That is, under PCM (), the procedure to compute EFR
is exactly the one inspired by BI reasoning. In this sense, enlarging the
preference model to PCM () could partially mitigate the conict between
EFR and BI.
10An extensive game is without ties if for any two di¤erent terminal nodes z and z0,
ui(z) 6= ui(z0) for all i. A game without relevant ties might have ties.
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2.5 Non-genericity
For a non-generic PI game, the indistinguishability might fail. Consider
the three-person PI game depicted in the following game tree.
Fig. 2. A three-person game  (x; y; z), where
x; y; z 2 R
Player 3 can be interpreted as nature moves which generate payo¤ un-
certainties for player 1 but not player 2. Consider 4 di¤erent preference
models: SEU, ordinal expeted utility model (OEU), multi-prior (MP) and
strongly monotone (Mon) preference model. By playing CLL0, player 1s
payo¤ is either 0 or 1, both are less than 2, the payo¤guaranteed by playing
S in the rst place. Therefore, any strongly monotone preference can not
support CLL0. It can be checked that for all 4 models, in the srt step, EFR
only eliminates CLL0 regardless the values of x; y; z. In the second step,




s x x x
l 1 z z
r 4 y 4
Di¤erent combinations of (x; y; z)might deliver di¤erent strategic impli-
cations for player 2 in the second step. Finally, the following table describes
non-rationalizable outcomes under di¤erent models and games.
SEU OEU MP Mon
 (2; 1; 4) nCs
 (1; 1; 4) nCs nCs
 (1; 0; 0) nClL nClL nClL
The result shows that any pair of preference models could be distin-
guished in some game. Note that this game is non-generic and not dom-
inance solvable. Consequently, the mutiplicity of rationalizable outcomes
lead to distinguishability. Hence, this example shows dominance solvability
is crutial to the indistinguishability.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have formulated a model of conditional preferences and
applied it to analyze the solution concept of EFR in extensive games. The
main result show that behavioral implications of EFR are observationally
indistinguishable among all preference models which admit SEU and satisfy
constant monotonicity in generic PI games, and the EFR outcome is further
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indistinguishable from the BI outcome. Through out this paper, we impose
a rather weak condition (probably the weakest), constant monotonicity, on
preference models. All regular preferences satisfy this condition and our
result is applicable for many preference models discussed in the literature,
e.g., the probabilistic sophistication model, the multi-priors model, the
Choquet expected utility model, the ordinal expected utility model and
the lexicographic preference model.
Unlike other indistinguishable results in literatures mentioned above,
our result does not rely on any topological or algebraic structure. Instead,
our result is based on the idea of consequentialism embedded in the condi-
tional preferences which are rich enough to regulate rational behavior. In
this respect, our result is sharp and sheds light on important and funda-
mental issues on rational strategic behavior in dynamic context.
Appendix: Proofs
Denition. Given h  (u) ;P ()i, a decreasing sequence of product sets
fDkgk0 is an elimination order of never P-best replies (EON-P) if the





), (iii) D1  r(P (D1)) where D1  \k0Dk.
Lemma 1. Given h  (u) ;P ()i, if   (u) is a PI game without relevant ties
and P ()  PCM (), then for an arbitrary EON-P, fDkgk0, there is at
most one outcome in D1 i.e., jg(D1)j  1. (j  j denotes the cardinality)
Proof of Lemma 1. Let Y = fh 2 [iHi : jg(D1 \ S(h))j > 1g. Suppose
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on the contrary jg(D1)j > 1, then Y includes the initial history and thus
is nonempty. Pick h 2 Y such that it has no successor in Y. jg0(D1 \
S(h))j > 1 ) 9s; s0 2 D1 \ S(h) such that g(s) 6= g(s0). Without loss of
generality, assume h 2 Hi. Then 8x i 2 D1 i \ S i(h), g(si; x i) = g(s).
Otherwise, since D1 is a product set, we can nd a successor of h in
Y. Similarly, we have 8x i 2 D1 i \ S i(h), g(s0i; x i) = g(s0). Since
the game is without relevant ties, ui(g(s)) 6= ui(g(s0)). Without loss of
generality, assume ui(g(s0)) > ui(g(s)). 8 i2 Pi (D1)  PCMi (D1),
since D1 \ S(h) 6= ;, the complement of D1 \ S(h) is Savage-null for
h. By constant monotonicity, s0i h si. Therefore si =2 Pi (D1), which




  (u) ;PSEU (), Let fDkgk0 and f Dkgk0 be elimi-
nation orders of never PSEU -best replies, then g(D1) = g( D1).
Proof of Lemma 2. According to Shimoji and Watson (1998), fDkgk0
and f Dkgk0 are elimination orders of conditional dominated strategies.
According to Chen and Micali (2013), the elimination is order independent,
i.e., g(D1) = g( D1). 
Proof of Theorem 1. Let fBIkgk0 be the backward iterated domi-
nance procedure. It is easy to see that fBIkgk0 is an elimination or-
der of never PSEU -best replies and g(BI1) is the unique backward induc-
tion outcome. Consider an arbitrary elimination order of never P-best
replies, fD0; :::; DKg. 8k  K, dene Dk+1 = Dk \ r  PSEU  Dk. Since
PSEU  P, fDkgk0 is an elimination order of never PSEU -best replies. By
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Lemma 2, g(BI1) = g(D1)  g(DK). Since P ()  PCM (), by Lemma
1,
g(DK)  1. Thus, g(DK) = g(BI1). The result follows since P-EFR
is the result of a special elimination order of never P-best replies. 





k0 inductively as S
0 = S and Sk+1 =
Sk \ r  PCM  Sk for all k  0. It su¢ ces to show BIk = Sk for all
k  0. The equivalence is trivial when k = 0, and suppose it holds for
0; 1; :::; k. It su¢ ces to show (i) s 2 BIknBIk+1 ) s 2 SknSk+1; (ii)
s 2 Bk+1 ) s 2 Sk+1. Let H1 denote the set of last decision nodes.
For all l  1, inductively dene H l+1 as the set of last decision nodes in
([i2NHi) nH l. Denote ah as the action prescribed by the backward induc-
tion at h. By denition,
BIk =

s 2 S : if s reaches some h 2 [kl=1H l, then sh = ah
	
(i) 8s 2 BIknBIk+1, s reaches some h 2 Hk+1 and sh 6= ah. Without
loss of generality, assume h 2 Hi. 8x 2 BIk \ S (h), xh = ah for all h
which follows h. Therefore, (si; x i) reaches the same terminal nodes for
all x 2 BIk\S (h). Let s = (s h ; ah), then si 2 BIk\S (h). Similarly,
(si ; x i) reaches the same terminal node for all x 2 BIk \ S (h). Since





Thus s 2 r  Sk. By induction hypothesis, s 2 SknSk+1.
(ii) 8s 2 BIk+1. 8h 2 [k+1l=1H l, if s reaches h, then sh0 = ah0 for all h0
equal to h or follows h, therefore, s is the most preference action for any
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constantly monotone h. 8h =2 [k+1l=1H l, either Ah is a singleton or there
are strategy proles in BIk \ S (h) leads to di¤erent terminal nodes. In
the rst case, s is the most preference action for any constantly monotone
h. In the second case, there exist hwhich is certain of BIk \ S (h) and
supports the non-constant act s () jh as the most preferred one. Overall,
s 2 r  Bk. By induction hypothesis, s 2 Sk+1. 
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3 Generic equivalence between perfectly and
sequentially rational strategic behavior
3.1 Introduction
In dealing with imperfection in (nite) extensive games, Selten (1975) intro-
duced the notion of (trembling-hand) perfect equilibrium. A perfect equi-
librium is an equilibrium that takes the possibility of o¤-the-equilibrium
play into account by assuming that the players, through the idea of trem-
bling hand, may choose all unintended strategies, albeit with small prob-
abilities. In the spirit of Seltens (1975) perfectness, Kreps and Wilson
(1982) proposed an alternative notion of sequential equilibrium, by impos-
ing the so-called sequential consistencyand sequential rationalityon
the behavior of every player. Sequential equilibrium is more inclusive and
weaker than perfect equilibrium: every perfect equilibrium must be sequen-
tial. Kreps and Wilson (1982, Section 7) pointed out that the two concepts
lead to similar prescriptions for equilibrium play: For each particular game
form and for almost all assignments of payo¤s to the terminal nodes, almost
all sequential equilibria are perfect equilibria, and the sets of sequential and
perfect equilibria fail to coincide only at payo¤s where the perfect equilib-
rium correspondence fails to be upper hemi-continuous. Blume and Zame
(1994) (hereafter BZ94) strengthened Kreps and Wilsons (1982) result and
showed that: For almost all assignments of payo¤s to the terminal nodes,
the sets of sequential and perfect equilibria are identical. The research line
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of genericity in game theory sheds light on important and fundamental
issues on rational strategic behavior; e.g., Harsanyi (1973) justied the sta-
bility of mixed strategy equilibria in generic games by Sards Theorem.
Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) also applied
Sards Theorem and the Regular Value Theorem in di¤erential topology to
study equilibrium distributions over terminal nodes and the generic nite-
ness of equilibria components (see also Govindan and Wilson (2001, 2006,
2012), Govindan and McLennan (2001), Hillas and Kohlberg (2002), Haller
and Laguno¤ (2002), McKelvey and McLennan (1996), and Pimienta and
Shen (2014) for more discussions).
BZ94 obtained the genericequivalence result by exploiting a special
semi-algebraic structure of the graphs of the perfect and sequential equilib-
rium correspondences, because graphs of the two correspondences can each
be written as a subset of a Euclidean space dened by a nite number of
polynomial equalities and inequalities. As they pointed out,1
We believe that, just as di¤erential topology has proved to
be the right tool for studying the ne structure of the Wal-
rasian equilibrium correspondence, so will real algebraic geom-
etry prove to be the right tool for studying the ne structure of
game-theoretic equilibrium correspondences. (BZ94, p.784)
In this paper, we follow BZ94 to study the relationship between perfectly
1van Damme (1992, Theorem 2.6.1) presented an almost alltheorem: In almost
allnormal form games, Nash equilibria are regularequilibria (hence proper equilib-
ria). Nevertheless, as van Damme (1992, p.45) pointed out, the analysis is of limited
value for the study of extensive form games as any nontrivial such game gives rise to a
nongeneric normal form.
65
and sequentially rational strategic behavior in a broad sense, from the
point of view of semi-algebraic geometry. We establish a general generic
equivalence theorem between perfect rationality and sequential rationality
in (nite) extensive games (Theorem 1). More specically, we show that the
di¤erence between the perfectly and sequentially rational correspondences
under very feasible behavioral assumptions occurs only for nongeneric
payo¤s (which are included in a lower-dimensional semi-algebraic payo¤s
set). We also apply our general genericequivalence theorem to various
solution concepts such as equilibrium, rationalizability, iterated dominance
and MACA (Greenberg et al. (2009)); in particular, we obtain a variety of
generic equivalence results as corollaries of Theorem 1 (Corollaries 1-4).
In a special class of genericgames with perfect information (i.e., it is
not a nongenericcase where, for some player, a same payo¤ is assigned to
two distinct terminal nodes), it is fairly easy to see that perfect/sequential
equilibrium yields the unique backward induction outcome (in terms of
strategy proles). In other words, sequential and perfect equilibria are
generically identical in games with perfect information. The similar re-
sult indeed holds true for the notion of perfect/sequential rationalizability.
That is, in the class of genericgames with perfect information, both per-
fect/sequential equilibrium and rationalizability lead to the unique back-
ward induction outcome, excluding a lower-dimensional set of payo¤s (see
Example in Section 2).
In this paper, we provide a unied approach to the genericrelation-
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ship between perfectly and sequentially rational strategic behavior. We
present a general framework to accommodate diversiform structures of be-
liefs for di¤erent solution concepts and distinct players in games by re-
strictions on the scope of trembling sequences (specied by sets X). The
graphs of perfectly and sequentially rational correspondences are related
respectively to the closure and vertical closure of a set RX of perfectly-
rational states (Proposition 1). Based upon Generic Local Triviality in
semi-algebraic geometry, we show that the closure and vertical closure of a
semi-algebraic set almost coincide (Proposition 2). Consequently, perfectly
and sequentially rational correspondences under the structures of beliefs
X are generically identical (Theorem 1). Our approach of this paper is
rather feasible and applicable to various solution concepts, as long as be-
lief structures X are semi-algebraic. In this paper, we show that the belief
structures behind many solution concepts in the literature are indeed semi-
algebraic; for instance, if X is restricted to a commontrembling sequence
for all players, Theorem 1 delivers BZ94s genericequivalence result for
perfect and sequential equilibria.
One major feature of this paper is that, unlike BZ94, our approach does
not rely directly on semi-algebraic properties of specic solution concepts.
More specically, BZ94s approach relies on the semi-algebraic property of
sets of perfect/sequential equilibria, which are dened by polynomial equal-
ities and inequalities, in nite dimensional Euclidean spaces. However, it is
less clear that other kinds of perfect/sequential solution concepts such as
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the sets of perfect/sequential rationalizable strategies are semi-algebraic.
Rather than working directly on the semi-algebraic property of solution
concepts, we here take a di¤erent approach by exploiting the semi-algebraic
property of the primitive set of perfectly-rational states, which delivers a
more general and fundamental generic equivalence between sequential and
perfect rational behavior (Theorem 1). Moreover, BZ94 dened perfect and
sequential equilibria by using perturbed gamespossibly with payo¤ per-
turbations (see Kreps and Wilson (1982)); our denitions in this paper are
based on an alternative idea of trembling strategiespossibly with payo¤
perturbations, so that our approach is feasible and applicable to unied
solution concepts of perfect-MACAand sequential-MACAsuggested
by Greenberg et al. (2009) in complex situations. As a matter of fact, our
paper provides an alternative approach to the study of the genericrela-
tionship between perfect and sequential equilibria in BZ94 (cf. also Section
5 for more discussions). From a technical perspective, BZ94 showed the
generic equivalence result by using the generic continuity property of semi-
algebraic correspondence; our proof is direct and dependent on the fact
that the closure and vertical closure of a semi-algebraic set are generically
identical (Proposition 2).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide an
illustrative example to explain the general generic equivalence relationship
between perfectly and sequentially rational strategic behavior. In Section
3, we present an analytical framework. In Section 4, we show a general
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genericequivalence theorem. We also obtain equivalence results for vari-
ous solution concepts, as corollaries of the general generic equivalence theo-
rem. Section 5 concludes. To facilitate reading, all the proofs are relegated
to Appendix.
3.2 An Illustrative Example
The following two-person game demonstrates that there is a general rela-
tionship of genericequivalence between perfectly and sequentially ratio-
nal strategic behavior (where a genericcase means that no same payo¤
is assigned to distinct terminal nodes for each player).2
Figure. 1. A two-person game  (u) where u 2 R.
Apparently, L dominates R (for player 1); l dominates r (for player 2) if
payo¤s u  1. It is easy to see that sequential equilibrium di¤ers from per-
fect equilibrium only at nongenericpayo¤u = 1. Moreover, the di¤erence
between perfect and sequential equilibria occurs only for nongenericpay-
o¤(s) that are resided in a lower-dimensional payo¤s space. BZ94 showed
that: For almost all or generic assignments of payo¤s to the termi-
nal nodes, the sets of sequential and perfect equilibria are identical. (This
2More precisely, a statement is generically true if it is false only for a lower
dimensional subset of the payo¤ vector space.
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example shows that there is no genericequivalence relationship between
Myersons (1978) proper equilibrium and perfect equilibrium: for generic
payo¤s u > 1, (S; r) is a perfect equilibrium but not a proper equilibrium.)
This sort of genericequivalence relationship indeed holds true for per-
fectly and sequentially rational strategic behavior in a broad sense: that
is, sequential rationalitydi¤ers from perfect rationalityonly at non-
generic payo¤ u = 1. For simplicity, we restrict attention to player 2s
behavior in the game in Figure 1. Clearly, strategy r is not perfectly ratio-
nal for player 2 since l (weakly) dominates r at nongenericpayo¤ u = 1.
But, r is sequentially rational when u = 1 if player 2 holds a belief assess-
ment (p; 1  p) = (0; 1) at his information set; this belief assessment can
be generated by a trembling sequence x"  "2L + "R + (1  "  "2)S
as " ! 0. Note that, although r is not optimal along the trembling se-
quencex", it can be optimal by a slight perturbation on payo¤ u. (For
instance, r is optimal along the trembling sequencex" under perturbed
payo¤ u" = 1+ 2".) In other words, r can be perfectly rational under
payo¤ perturbations. Subsequently, sequentially rational strategy r can be
obtained from a limit point of perfectly-rational states (x"; u"; r), i.e.,
lim"!0 (x"; u"; r) = (1  S; 1; r).
In fact, every sequentially rational strategy can be characterized by a
limit point of perfectly-rational states (see Lemma 1 in Appendix), while
every perfectly rational strategy is naturally associated with a limit point
of perfectly-rational states, without payo¤ perturbations. That is, the set
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of sequentially (resp. perfectly) rational strategies can be characterized by
the closure (resp. vertical closure) of the set of perfectly-rational states (see
Proposition 1 in Section 3). By Generic Local Triviality in semi-algebraic
geometry, the closure and vertical closure of the set of perfectly rational
states are almost the same (see Proposition 2 in Section 4). Consequently,
we obtain our central result of this paper: sequential rationality di¤ers from
perfect rationality only at nongenericpayo¤s (see Theorem 1 in Section
4). This result is applicable to various kinds of solution concepts discussed
in the literature, such as equilibrium, rationalizability, iterated dominance
and MACA (see Corollaries 1-4 in Section 4). For example, if the belief
structure allows di¤erent players to have distinct trembling sequences, our
Theorem 1 yields a genericequivalence result for perfect and sequential
rationalizability (Corollary 1); if the structure of beliefs is restricted to
a common trembling sequence for all players, our Theorem 1 delivers
BZ94s generic equivalence result for perfect and sequential equilibria
(Corollary 2).
3.3 An analytical framework
3.3.1 Set-up
We consider a (nite) extensive form with perfect recall:3
  = (N; V;H; fAhgh2H),
3Since the formal description of an extensive form is by now standard (see, for in-
stance, Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Osborne and Rubinstein (1994)), we here include
the necessary notation only. We note that our approach in this paper can be easily
extend to games with nature moves.
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where N = f1; 2;    ; ng is the set of players, V is the set of nodes, H is
the set of information sets, Ah is the set of actions available at information
set h. Let Z  V denote the set of terminal nodes. A payo¤ function for
player i is a function ui : Z ! R. Let U = i2NUi where Ui = RZ is
the space of player is payo¤ functions. The game  (u) is specied by the
extensive form   and the payo¤s u 2 U .
A mixed action at information set h is a probability distribution over
the actions in Ah. Let Yh denote the set of mixed actions at h (i.e. Yh =
(Ah)). The set of player is (behavior) strategies is Yi = h2HiYh (where
Hi is the set of player is information sets). Let Y = i2NYi andY i = j 6=i
Yj. (For a prole y 2 Y, we also write y = (yi; y i) = (yh; y h).)
The sets Y, Yi, Y i and Y h can be viewed as semi-algebraic sets,
which are dened by linear equalities and inequalities, in nite dimensional
Euclidean spaces.4 Fix a terminal node z, the probability Pr(zjy) that
z is reached (from the initial node) is a polynomial function of y 2 Y.
In game  (u), is expected payo¤ from y 2 Y is dened as: vi(y; ui) =
z2Zui(z) Pr (zjy), which is semi-algebraic on Y Ui.
3.3.2 Perfect rationality and sequential rationality
Consider a game  (u). For a strategy-prole vector x 2Yn, we write
x  (ix)i2N such that ix 2 Y for each player i. Let int(Y) denote the
4A set X  Rn is semi-algebraic if it is the nite union of sets of the form fx 2
Rn : f1(x) = 0;    ; fk(x) = 0 and g1(x) > 0;    ; gm(x) > 0g, where the fi and gj are
polynomials with real coe¢ cients. A correspondence is semi-algebraic if and only if its
graph is a semi-algebraic set.
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set of completely-mixed-strategy proles,5 and let X  [int (Y)]n. In this
paper, we use X to allude to a structure of beliefs, to which the trembling
way of beliefsor conjecturessequence for players connes. Let xt X! x
denote a sequence fxtg1t=0 in X which converges to x in Yn. (Note: We
allow two players i and j to have distinct trembling sequences ixt  ix
and jxt  jx, respectively. We use yt  y to denote a trembling sequence
fytg1t=0 in int(Y) which converges to y in Y as t!1.) An X-assessment is
a prole-and-distributions vector (x; )  (ix; i)i2N such that there exist
a sequence xt X! x and, for each player i, ti ! i where ti is a collec-
tion of distributions over is information sets, derived from ixt in int (Y)
using Bayesrule. Let Bi(ix; ui) denote the set of player is locallybest
responses to ix 2 Y, i.e., Bi(ix; ui) 







  vi   ah; ix h ; ui 8ah 2 Ah	 .
Denition 1. Let Y  Y and X  [int (Y)]n.
(a) [Perfect Rationality] A strategy prole y 2 Y is perfectly rational
with respect to (Y; X) if there exists xt X! x such that, for each player
i, ix i 2 Y i and ixi = yi 2 Bi (ixt; ui) 8t.
(b) [Sequential Rationality] A strategy prole y 2 Y is sequentially
rational with respect to (Y; X) if there exists an X-assessment (x; )
such that for all i and h 2 Hi, ix i 2 Y i and ixi = yi 2 argmaxy0i2Yi
5A completely-mixed-strategy prole y 2 Y assigns strictly positive probability to





ix; i) ; uijh).6
That is, a strategy prole y is perfectly rational with respect to (Y; X)
if there exists a sequence fxtg1t=0 of trembling-beliefs proles for all play-
ers in the belief structure X (which converges to x =(ix)i2N in Yn) such
that, for each player i, the limit opponent-strategy prole ix i resides in
the scope Y i of opponentsplausible choices and the limit strategy ixi is
consistent with yi which is a locallybest response along the trembling
beliefs sequence fixtg1t=0. Similarly, a strategy prole y is sequentially ra-
tional with respect to (Y; X) if there exists an X-assessment (x; ) such
that, for each player i, the limit opponent-strategy prole ix i resides in
the scope Y i and the limit strategy ixi is consistent with yi which is a se-
quentiallybest response at every information set h 2 Hi. Let PBX(Y; u)
denote the set of perfectly-rational strategy proles with respect to (Y; X),
and let SBX(Y; u) denote the set of sequentially-rational strategy proles
with respect to (Y; X).
We next provide two characterizations of perfect rationality and se-
quential rationality under a wide range of behavioral assumptions. For an
extensive form   dene
RX  (x; u; y) 2 X U  Y : yi 2 Bi  ix; ui 8i 2 N	 .
That is, (x; u; y) 2 RX represents a state where every player is per-















; ig is the probability that z is







fectly rational for payo¤s u 2 U and belief x 2 X. Since   is nite,
Bi (
ix; ui) is characterized by nitely many polynomial inequalities and thus
semi-algebraic. By Tarski-Seidenberg Theorem, RX is a semi-algebraic set
whenever X is semi-algebraic. Let cl(RX) and vclU(RX) denote the closure
of RX and vertical closure of RX (on U), respectively, i.e.,
cl(RX)  (x; u; y) :  xt; ut; yt! (x; u; y) and  xt; ut; yt 2 RX for all t	 ;
vclU(RX) 

(x; u; y) :
 
xt; u; yt
! (x; u; y) and  xt; u; yt 2 RX for all t	 .
Call x is consistent with (Y; y)if for every player i, ix i 2 Y i and ixi =
yi. The following proposition states that PBX(Y; u) and SBX(Y; u) are
related to the closure and vertical closure of RX (under the consistency
requirement), respectively.
Proposition 1. For any Y  Y and X  [int (Y)]n, (a) y 2 PBX(Y; u),
9 (x; u; y) 2 vclU(RX) s.t. x is consistent with (Y; y); (b) y 2 SBX(Y; u),
9 (x; u; y) 2 cl(RX) s.t. x is consistent with (Y; y).
To relate to Seltens (1975) perfectness, Kreps andWilson (1982, Propo-
sition 6) provided a useful characterization of sequential equilibrium in
terms of payo¤ perturbations; they relaxed Seltens criterion by allowing
some (vanishingly) small uncertainty on the part of playerspayo¤s. BZ94
o¤ered an alternative characterization of sequential equilibrium in terms
of perturbed games. Proposition 1 provides two fundamental character-
izations of perfect rationality and sequential rationality under a broader
range of behavioral assumptions; for example, if Y is restricted to a sin-
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gleton set and X is restricted to a commontrembling-beliefs sequence in
fx 2 [int(Y)]n : ix = jx for all i 6= jg, Proposition 1(b) yields an analogy
of Kreps and Wilsons (1982) characterization of sequential equilibrium.
3.4 Generic equivalence theorem
In this section, we establish a general genericequivalence between perfect
rationality and sequential rationality. Our proof is based on the fundamen-
tal structure of semi-algebraic set: each semi-algebraic set has only a nite
number of open connected components, and has a well-dened dimension.
The following property of semi-algebraic sets is crucial in our paper.
Generic Local Triviality [Hardt (1980); Bochnak, Coste and Roy
(1987, Corollary 9.3.2)]. Let B and U be semi-algebraic sets and let
f : B ! U be a continuous, semi-algebraic function. There is a (relatively)
closed, lower-dimensional semi-algebraic (critical) subset U0  U such
that for each of the nite number of (relatively) open connected components
Uk of UnU0 there is a semi-algebraic (ber) set Ck and a semi-algebraic
homeomorphism 'k : Uk  Ck ! f 1  Uk such that f  'k (u; c) = u for
all u 2 Uk and c 2 Ck.
Generic Local Triviality implies that, for any semi-algebraic set, the
closure and vertical closure are almost the same: that is, the di¤erence
between the closure and vertical closure of a semi-algebraic set is lower-
dimensional. Formally,
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Proposition 2. Let X  Rn+m be a semi-algebraic set. (a) cl (X) and
vclRn (X) are semi-algebraic. (b) There exists a lower-dimensional semi-
algebraic subset X0Rn  Rn such that cl (X) nvclRn (X)  X0Rn  Rm.
By Propositions 1 and 2, we obtain the central result of this paper:
a general generic equivalence theorem between perfect rationality and
sequential rationality.
Theorem 1. Consider an extensive form  . For any semi-algebraic
set X  [int(Y)]n, there is a (relatively) closed, lower-dimensional semi-
algebraic subset U0  U such that, for all u 2 UnU0, PBX(Y; u) =
SBX(Y; u) 8Y  Y. Furthermore, if X = [int(Y)]n, there is a (relatively)
closed, lower-dimensional semi-algebraic subset V 0  Ui = RZ such that,
for all u 2 i2N (UinV 0), PBX(Y; u) = SBX(Y; u) 8Y  Y.
Theorem 1 establishes a fundamental and elementary genericequiv-
alence between perfect rationality and sequential rationality. More speci-
cally, the equivalence holds for all payo¤vectors outside a lower-dimensional
subset U0  U = RNZ ; under a belief structure in product form: X =
[int(Y)]n, the equivalence holds for all assigned payo¤s for each player
outside a lower-dimensional subset V 0  Ui = RZ , rather than a lower-
dimensional subset U0  U . In this paper, we consider two kinds of belief
structures used in extensive games:
1. X = [int(Y)]n. Under this belief structure, di¤erent players i and j
are allowed to have distinct trembling sequences ixt  ix and jxt  
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jx. For all Y  Y, we denote PB(Y; u)  PBX(Y; u) and SB(Y; u) 
SBX(Y; u).
2. X  fx 2 [int(Y)]n : ix = jx for all i 6= jg. Under this belief
structure, di¤erent players i and j are required to have a common
trembling sequence xt  x. For all Y  Y, we denote PB(Y; u) 
PBX(Y; u) and SB(Y; u)  SBX(Y; u); in particular, we write PB(y; u)
and SB(y; u) respectively for PB(fyg ; u) and SB(fyg ; u), for sim-
plicity.
Denition 2. In game  (u), we dene
(a) [Perfect Equilibrium] A strategy prole y is a perfect equilibrium if
y 2 PB(y; u), i.e., there exists a (common) sequence yt  y such







(b) [Sequential Equilibrium] A strategy prole y is a sequential equilib-
rium if y 2 SB(y; u), i.e., there exists a (common) assessment (y; )
such that for all i 2 N and h 2 Hi, yi 2 argmaxy0i2Yi vi(y0i; (y; ); uijh).
(c) [Perfect Rationalizability] A strategy prole y is perfectly rational-
izable if it is supported by a perfectly rationalizable set Y  Y, i.e.,
y 2 Y  PB (Y; u).
(d) [Sequential Rationalizability] A strategy prole y is sequentially
rationalizable if it is supported by a sequentially rationalizable set
Y  Y, i.e., y 2 Y  SB (Y; u).
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Denition 2(a) is Seltens (1975) notion of perfect equilibrium. Def-
inition 2(b) is Kreps and Wilsons (1982) notion of sequential equilib-
rium. Denition 2(c) is a variant of Greenberg et al.s (2009) notion of
null MACA, which, if allows for correlations, is equivalent to Herings and
Vannetelboschs (1999) denition of weakly perfect rationalizability in
simultaneous-move games. Denition 2(d) is a variant of Dekel et al.s
(1999, 2002) sequential rationalizability (with point beliefs).
Remark 1. For simplicity, we consider only point beliefs over opponents
strategies in the notion of rationalizability (see Bernheim (1984)). Ap-
parently, since every singleton of a perfectly/sequentially rationalizable
strategy prole is a weakversion of perfect/sequential equilibrium (by
allowing distinct trembling sequences for di¤erent players),7 every per-
fect/sequential equilibrium must be perfectly/sequentially rationalizable.
For game   (u), we need to introduce the following notation:
7That is, di¤erent players may not necessarily have the same beliefs on how players
tremble. Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, p.341) pointed out, Why should all players
have the same theory to explain deviations that, after all, are either probability-0 events
or very unlikely, depending on ones methodological point of view? The standard de-
fense is that this requirement is in the spirit of equilibrium analysis, since equilibrium
supposes that all players have common beliefs about the othersstrategies. Although
this restriction is usually imposed, we are not sure that we nd it convincing.
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PE (u): set of perfect equilibria
SE (u): set of sequential equilibria
WPE(u): set of weaklyperfect equilibria
WSE(u): set of weaklysequential equilibria
PR (u): set of perfectly rationalizable strategy proles
SR (u): set of sequentially rationalizable strategy proles
According to Theorem 1, PBX(Y; u) and SBX(Y; u) generically coincide
for any arbitrary Y  Y. Note that the perfect and sequential notions
of equilibrium and rationalizability are based on the basic assumptions of
perfect rationality and sequential rationality, we obtain genericequiva-
lence results for equilibrium and rationalizability, as immediate corollaries
of Theorem 1.
Corollary 1. Consider an extensive form  . There is a (relatively) closed,
lower-dimensional semi-algebraic subset V 0  Ui = RZ such that, for all
u 2 i2N (UinV 0), Y (u) is a sequentially rationalizable set in   (u) i¤
Y (u) is a perfectly rationalizable set in   (u). Moreover, a sequentially-
rationalizable-set correspondence Y () (i.e., Y : U  Y such that Y (u) 
SB (Y (u) ; u) 8u 2 U) is perfectly rationalizable for all u 2 U at which
SB (Y () ; ) is lower hemi-continuous and PB (Y () ; ) is upper hemi-
continuous.
In particular, PR (u) = SR (u) and WPE (u) = WSE (u) for all
u 2 i2N (UinV 0). Moreover, PR (u) = SR (u) for all u 2 U at which
correspondence SR () is lower hemi-continuous and PR () is upper hemi-
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continuous; WPE (u) = WSE (u) for all u 2 U at which correspondence
WSE () is lower hemi-continuous and WPE () is upper hemi-continuous.
Remark 2. The class of symmetric games or zero-sum two-person games has
the same dimension of Ui, because payo¤ vectors are fully determined by a
particular player is payo¤s. Consequently, Corollary 1 implies that, in the
class of symmetric games or zero-sum two-person games, the equivalence
holds for all genericallyassigned payo¤s ui 2 UinV 0 (for the particular
player i).
A critial assumption of the beliefs structure in Corollary 1 is: X =
[int(Y)]n; accordingly, we allow two players i and j to have distinct trembling-
beliefs sequences ixt  ix and jxt  jx, respectively. If we impose a
stronger assumption of the beliefs structure, i.e., X is restricted to a com-
montrembling-beliefs sequence for all players in fx 2 [int(Y)]n : ix = jx
for all i 6= jg, Theorem 1 yields BZ94s (Theorem 4) genericequivalence
result for perfect and sequential equilibria.
Corollary 2. Consider an extensive form  . There is a (relatively) closed,
lower-dimensional semi-algebraic subset U0  U such that PE (u) = SE (u)
for all u 2 UnU0. Moreover, PE (u) = SE (u) for all u 2 U at which
correspondence SE () is lower hemi-continuous and PE () is upper hemi-
continuous.
Normal forms are a special case of extensive forms with simultaneous
moves. Corollary 3 asserts that, in any normal form, iterated elimination of
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weakly dominated strategies (IEWDS) is generically an order-independent
procedure which is equivalent to iterated elimination of strictly dominated
strategies (IESDS).
Corollary 3. Consider a normal form  . There exists a (relatively) closed,
lower-dimensional semi-algebraic subset V 0  Ui = RZ such that for all
u 2 i2N (UinV 0), every IEWDS procedure is an IESDS procedure; hence
IEWDS is (generically) an order-independent procedure.
In the context of extensive games, Greenberg et al. (2009) presented a
unied solution concept of mutually acceptable course of action (MACA)
for situations where perfectly rational individuals with di¤erent beliefs
agree to a shared course of action. We end this section by establishing
a genericequivalence between perfect-MACA and sequential-MACA, as
an immediate corollary of Theorem 1. In doing so, we extend the simple
version of point beliefs to a more complicated version of (uncorrelated)
beliefs in extensive games. Following Dekel et al. (2002), we say a strat-
egy yi of player i is in the extensive-form convex hull of Yi  Yi, de-
noted by coe(Yi), if there is a nite set

y1i ; :::; y
M
i






 (ymi )Mm=1 and a sequence (m;t)
M
m=1 !  of distri-
butions on f1; :::;Mg, such that yti generated by the convex combination
Mm=1
m;tym;ti (in terms of realization outcomes) converges to yi. Let
coe(Y )  i2Ncoe(Yi). In the spirit of Greenberg et al. (2009), we intro-
duce the perfectand sequentialnotions of MACA.8
8The formulation of an extensive-form convex hullpurports to deal with the no-
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Denition 3. In game  (u), a course of action  (u) = (h (u))h2H , with
h (u) 2 Yh [ f;g, is a perfect-MACA (or sequential-MACA) if there is
Y = i2NYi  Y supporting  (u), i.e.,
(i) for all h 2 H, if h (u) 6= ;, then yh = h (u) for all y 2 Y ;
(ii) Y  PB(coe(Y ); u) (or Y  SB(coe(Y ); u)).
The following corollary asserts that the notions of perfect-MACA and
sequential-MACA are generically equivalent.
Corollary 4. Consider an extensive form  . There is a (relatively) closed,
lower-dimensional semi-algebraic subset V 0  Ui = RZ such that for all
u 2 i2N (UinV 0), the set of perfect-MACAs coincides with the set of
sequential-MACAs and, moreover, a sequential-MACA  (u) is supported
by Y i¤  (u) is a perfect-MACA supported by Y .
Remark 3. Greenberg et al. (2009) demonstrated that, by varying the
degree of completeness of the underlying course of action, MACA can be
related to many commonly used game-theoretic solutions, such as equilib-
rium, self-conrming equilibrium, and rationalizability. More specically,
(i) If  (u) is a completeMACA (which satises h (u) 6= ? 8h 2 H),
Corollary 4 yields the genericequivalence result between weakly
torious problem of imperfection under subjective uncertainty over (behavior) strategies;
cf. Dekel et al. (2002) and Greenberg et al. (2009) for more discussions. For the purpose
of this paper, we here adopt Dekel et al.s (2002) denition of extensive-form convex
hull to dene the notions of perfect-MACA and sequential-MACA (within Greenberg
et al.s (2009) framework of MACA).
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sequential equilibria and weakly perfect equilibria in Corollary 1
(cf. Greenberg et al.s (2009) Claim 3.1.1),
(ii) If  (u) is a nullMACA (which satises h (u) = ? 8h 2 H), Corol-
lary 4 yields a generic equivalence result between Dekel et al.s
(1999, 2002) sequential rationalizability and perfect rationalizability
with trembling beliefs in an extensive-form convex hull, rather than
the simple version of point beliefs used in Corollary 1 (cf. Greenberg
et al.s (2009) Claim 3.3.1), and
(iii) If  (u) is a pathMACA (which satises h (u) 6= ? whenever h
is reached with positive probability under  (u)), Corollary 4 yields
a generic equivalence result between Dekel et al.s (1999, 2002)
sequentially rationalizable self-conrming equilibrium (SRSCE) and
Greenberg et al.s (2009) path MACA.
We would also like to point out that Dekel et al. (1999, Footnote 4)
expected this kind of generic equivalence, but they o¤ered no formal
analysis of this issue. We thereby o¤er such a formal analysis from this
perspective.
3.5 Concluding remarks
Blume and Zame (1994) strengthened Kreps andWilsons (1982) result and
showed that, for almost all assignments of payo¤s to the terminal nodes,
the sets of sequential and perfect equilibria are identical. In this paper,
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we have extended BZ94s result to more general settings of strategic inter-
actions. We have formulated and proved a general generic equivalence
theorem between perfect rationality and sequential rationality in exten-
sive games. More specically, we have presented a general framework to
accommodate many structures of beliefs discussed in the literature and
shown that the di¤erence between perfectly and sequentially rational cor-
respondences occurs only in a lower-dimensional payo¤s set. We have also
demonstrated that we can obtain a variety of generic equivalence results
for various kinds of solution concepts such as equilibrium, rationalizabil-
ity, iterated dominance and MACA, as corollaries of our general generic
equivalence theorem (Theorem 1). The study of this paper helps deepen
our understanding of the relationship between perfectly and sequentially
rational strategic behavior with diversiform beliefs.
In this paper, we have followed Dekel et al. (1999, 2002) and Green-
berg et al. (2009) to adopt a simple and convenient way of dening per-
fect/sequential equilibrium and rationalizability by using trembling con-
jectures and present a unied framework for the study of the generic
relationship between perfectly and sequentially rational strategic behavior.
Alternatively, one may follow BZ94s approach to analyze perfectly and
sequentially rational strategic behavior by using perturbed games. How-
ever, there is no formal formulation of perfect/sequential rationalizability
for extensive games, in terms of perturbed games, in the literature, al-
though Bernheim (1984, pp.1021-1022) outlined such a notion of perfect
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rationalizability in normal form games. Herings and Vannetelbosch (1999,
Example G7) showed that, unlike the notion of perfect equilibrium, there
are di¤erent denitions of perfect rationalizability by using trembling con-
jectures or perturbed games (cf. also Börgers (1994)). In particular,
the alternative denition of perfect/sequential rationalizability by using
perturbed gamesmay su¤er Fudenberg and Tiroles (1991) criticism: it
implicitly requires that all players have the same theory to form common
trembling conjectures, as illustrated by the following example.
Figure. 2. A three-person game.
It is easy to see that the strategy prole y = (E1; C2; R3), marked by
bold lines in Figure 2, is a weakly sequential/perfect equilibrium and,
by Corollary 1, y is sequentially/perfectly rationalizable for almost all as-
signments of payo¤s to the terminal nodes. But, the prole y is not se-
quentially/perfectly rationalizable in terms of perturbed games. To see
this, note that (i) in any perturbed game, because E1 strictly dominates
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L1 and R1, there is a unique rationalizable strategy for player 1 i.e., play-
ing L1 and R1 with the minimum probabilities specied in the perturbed
game, and (ii) player 2 and 3 must hold common trembling conjectures
in commonly known perturbed games. But, C2 is sequentially rational
only if p  1=3; R3 is sequentially rational only if q  2=3. Subsequently,
the prole (C2; R3) cannot be sequentially/perfectly rationalizable in terms
of perturbed games. This argument is valid for a neighborhood of the
payo¤s to the terminal nodes.9 On the one hand, this kind of implicit
requirement of common trembling conjectures appears to be less con-
vincing and arguable especially in a non-equilibrium setting. On the other
hand, as the example shows, sequential and perfect rationalizability are
not equivalent for generic games under such requirement. Therefore, we do
not use this alternative way of formulating perfectly/sequentially rational
strategic behavior in this paper. Our approach avoids the criticism and
successfully extends the generic equivalence to ratinalizability and many
other solution concepts.
As we have emphasized, unlike BZ94s approach, our analysis of this
paper does not rely directly on semi-algebraic properties of specic solu-
tions concepts (e.g., the semi-algebraic structure of perfect and sequential
equilibrium correspondences in BZ94). Instead, our approach of this paper
is based upon the primitive set RX of perfectly-rational states, which
is naturally semi-algebraic with diversiform structures of beliefs, so that
9This example also shows that the notions of perfect Bayesian equilibrium and se-
quential equilibrium are generically di¤erent, because (E1; C2; R3) is a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium.
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it is feasible and applicable to various solution concepts discussed in the
literature. We believe that our general genericequivalence theorem pro-
vides a useful and complementary way for the study of the relationship
between perfectly and sequentially rational strategic behavior in complex
environments.10
Finally, we would like to mention that, in contrast to BZ94s approach
to complete-information games through perturbations on payo¤s, Wein-
stein and Yildiz (2007) took a di¤erent approach to generic properties of
rational strategic behavior and showed, in the framework of incomplete-
information games with richness assumption, a generic uniqueness result
for the structure of rationalizability by perturbing (in the product topology
of the universal type space) the beliefs of the type. It is intriguing to extend
the analysis of this paper to a general situation by allowing perturbations
both on payo¤s and the beliefs of the type. We leave it for future research.
Appendix: Proofs
The following lemma establishes a relationship between perfect rationality
and sequential rationality: that is, sequential rationality can be character-
ized by perfect rationality against payo¤ perturbations.
Lemma 1. For any Y  Y and X  [int (Y)]n, y 2 SBX(Y; u) i¤ there
exist ut ! u and xt X! x such that x is consistent with (Y; y) and for
10We note that our approach of this paper is also applicable to the alternative de-
nitions of perfectly and sequentially rational strategic behavior by using perturbed
games. In doing so, we need to consider a more elaborated set of perfectly-rational
states with game perturbationsand then obtain an analogous genericequivalence.
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each player i, yi 2 Bi(ixt; uti) 8t.
Proof of Lemma 1. "(": Let xt X! x and x be consistent with (Y; y).
Without loss of generality, assume (xt; t) X! (x; ), where t is derived
from xt using Bayes rule. Consider player i, suppose that there exist







  vi  (y0h; ixt h); utijh 8y0h 2 Yh.11 Since vi((yh; ) ; jh)
is continuous, vi ((yh; ix h) ; uijh)  vi ((y0h; ix h) ; uijh). By the one de-
viation property (see, e.g., Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, p.227)), for
all h 2 Hi, vi ((yi; ix i) ; uijh)  vi ((y0i; ix i) ; uijh) 8y0i 2 Yi. That is,
yi 2 SBi(ix; ui) for all i and thus y 2 SBX(Y; u).
")": Let y 2 SBX(Y; u). Then, for each player i there is (xt; t) X!
(x; ) such that for all i, ix i 2 Y i and ixi = yi is sequentially optimal
to assessment (ix; i). Clearly, ixt ! ix. We proceed to construct a payo¤
sequence uti ! ui such that yi 2 Bi(ixt; uti) for all t.




of a set Hi as follows: H li 
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ut;l 1i (z), otherwise
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  vi  y0i;   ix; i ; uijh.
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8h 2 H li .12 Since   is per-











































i.e., yi 2 Bi(ixt; ut;Li ).
It remains to show ut;Li ! uLi = ui. We prove this by induction on l.
Clearly, ut;0i ! ui trivially holds. Suppose ut;`i ! u`i = ui for `  l   1.
By construction of ut;li , it su¢ ces to show 
t
ah








. Because of the continuity of vi, for
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tah ! 0. 
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose y 2 PBX(Y; u). Then, there is xt X! x
such that (xt; u; y) 2 RX for all t; ix i 2 Y i and ixi = yi for all i.
12For y h 2 Y h and ui 2 Ui, dene Bh (y h; ui) 
fyh 2 Yh : vi((yh; y h) ; ui)  vi((ah; y h) ; ui) 8ah 2 A(h)g.
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Clearly, (xt; u; y) ! (x; u; y). Thus (x; u; y) 2 vclUi
 RX. Conversely,
suppose (x; u; y) 2 vclUi
 RX, ix i 2 Y i and ixi = yi for all i. Then
there exists a sequence (xt; u; yt) 2 RX converging to (x; u; y). Since   is
nite and yt ! y, there is a su¢ ciently large T such that, for all t  T ,
ah 2support(yh) implies ah 2support(yth) and ah 2 Bh (ixt; ui) 8h 2 Hi.
Therefore, yi 2 Bi (ixt; ui) for all i and t  T . That is, y 2 PBX(Y; u).
Since a similar argument holds true with payo¤ perturbations, by using
Lemma 1, Proposition 1(b) is valid. 
Proof of Proposition 2. (a) vclRn (X) can be rewritten as
f(a; b) 2 Rn  Rm : 8" > 0, 9 (a; b0) 2 X s.t. kb  b0k < "g .
Since X is semi-algebraic, it follows from Tarski-Seidenberg Theorem that
vclRn (X) is also semi-algebraic. Similarly, cl (X) is semi-algebraic.
(b) Denote  : X ! XRn as the projection function of X onto the
rst n coordinates, where XRn = fa 2 Rn : 9b 2 Rm s.t. (a; b) 2 Xg.
X is endowed with the relative topology of the usual product topology
Rn  Rm. Then  is continuous and its graph is f((a; b) ; a) : (a; b) 2 Xg,
which is semi-algebraic. Thus we can apply Generic Local Triviality to .
Denote A0 as the critical set with dimA0 < n, XRnnA0 = [kAk as the
decomposition into nitely many connected open components, Ck as the
ber for Ak. Denote 'k as the semi-algebraic homeomorphism between
Ak  Ck and  1  Ak. Moreover, all 'k satisfy the following condition:
8a 2 Ak, 8c 2 Ck,   'k (a; c) = a. (#)
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 nAk [ cl (A0). Suppose (a; b) 2 cl (X) and a 2
RnnX0Rn. By the decomposition of XRn, X = [k 1
 
Ak
 [  1 (A0), then









(at; bt) = (a^t; ct) 2 Ak  Ck, then   'k (a^t; ct) =




Since at ! a, a 2 cl  Ak. Thus a 2 Ak. Then (a; ct) is a sequence in




for all t. Since k(a; ct)  (at; ct)k ! 0
and 'k is continuous,










  vclRn (X).





 nAk < n, dimX0Rn < n.

Proof of Theorem 1. Since X is semi-algebraic, RX is a semi-algebraic
set by Tarski-Seidenberg Theorem. Applying Proposition 2 to RX, there
exists a closed semi-algebraic subset U0  U with dimU0 < dimU such
that cl(RX)nvclU(RX)  Yn  U0  Y. Therefore, for all u 2 UnU0,
(x; u; y) 2 cl(RX), (x; u; y) 2 vclU(RX). ()
Consider an arbitrary set Y  Y. For all u 2 UnU0, we have
y 2 SBX(Y; u) Proposition 1() 9 (x; u; y) 2 cl(RX) s.t. ix i 2 Y i and ixi = yi 8i
()() 9 (x; u; y) 2 vclU(RX) s.t. ix i 2 Y i and ixi = yi 8i
Proposition 1() y 2 PBX(Y; u).
Now let X = [int (Y)]n. Then, RX = i2NRXi where RXi  f( ix; ui; yi) 2
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int (Y)  Ui  Yi : yi 2 Bi (ix; ui)g 8i 2 N . Applying Proposition 2
to each set RXi , there exists a closed semi-algebraic subset U0i  Ui with
dimU0i < dimUi such that cl(RXi )nvclUi(RXi )  Y  U0i  Yi. Dene
V 0  [i2NU0i . Therefore, for all u 2 i2N (UinV 0), the identity () holds.
The rest of Theorem 1 follows similarly. 
In order to show Corollaries 1 and 2, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Let Y : U  Y and Y 0 : U  Y. Suppose that U0 
fu 2 U : Y (u) 6= Y 0 (u)g is a lower dimensional subset of U . Then Y (u) 
Y 0 (u) for all u 2 U at which Y () is lower hemi-continuous and Y 0 () is
upper hemi-continuous.
Proof of Lemma 2. Since U0 is lower-dimensional, U0 contains no open
set in U . Let u 2 U . Therefore, we can nd a sequence futg1t=1 in UnU0
such that ut ! u and Y (ut) = Y 0 (ut) for all t. If y 2 Y (u), by lower
hemi-continuity of Y (), there exists a subsequence utk ! u such that
yk ! y and yk 2 Y (utk) = Y 0 (utk). Since correspondence Y 0 () is upper
hemi-continuous, y 2 Y 0 (u). That is, Y (u)  Y 0 (u). 
Proof of Corollary 1. Let Y (u) be a sequentially rationalizable set in
  (u), i.e., Y (u)  SB (Y (u) ; u). By Theorem 1, there exists a (relatively)
closed, lower-dimensional semi-algebraic subset V 0  Ui = RZ such that
Y (u)  SB (Y (u) ; u) = PB (Y (u) ; u) for all u 2 i2N (UinV 0). There-
fore, for all u 2 i2N (UinV 0), sequentially rationalizable sets are precisely
perfectly rationalizable sets in   (u). Now, suppose that SB (Y () ; ) is
lower hemi-continuous and PB (Y () ; ) is upper hemi-continuous at u. By
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Theorem 1, fu 2 U : SB (Y (u) ; u) 6= PB (Y (u) ; u)g  Un [i2N (UinV 0)]
is a lower dimensional subset of U . By Lemma 2, SB (Y (u) ; u)  PB (Y (u) ; u).
Therefore, Y (u)  SB (Y (u) ; u)  PB (Y (u) ; u) is a perfectly rational-
izable set.
Since PR (u) = [YPB(Y;u)Y and SR (u) = [YSB(Y;u)Y , it follows
that SR (u) = PR (u) for all u 2 i2N (UinV 0). Since WPE (u) =
[YPB(Y;u); jY j=1Y and WSE (u) = [YSB(Y;u); jY j=1Y ,13 it follows that
WPE (u) = WSE (u) for all u 2 i2N (UinV 0). The rest of Corollary
1 follows immediately from Lemma 2. 
Proof of Corollary 2. Let X  fx 2 [int(Y)]n : ix = jx for all i 6= jg.
Then, y 2 SE (u) i¤ y 2 SBX(y; u). Since int(Y) is semi-algebraic in Y,
X is semi-algebraic in Yn. By Theorem 1, we can nd a semi-algebraic
lower-dimensional subset U0, such that y 2 PBX(y; u) = SBX(y; u) for all
u 2 UnU0. Note that, for all u 2 UnU0, PBX(y; u) = SBX(y; u) 8y 2 Y.
Therefore, PE (u) = fy : y 2 PBX(y; u)g = fy : y 2 SBX(y; u)g = SE (u)
for all u 2 UnU0.
Now, suppose that SE () is lower hemi-continuous and PE () is upper
hemi-continuous at u. Since fu 2 U : SE (u) 6= PE (u)g  U0 is a lower
dimensional subset, by Lemma 2, SE (u)  PE (u). Thus, SE (u) =
PE (u). 




be an arbitrary (nite) IEWDS procedure in  (u). Since   is a
13 jY j = 1 means that the cardinality of Y is 1.
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normal form, a 2 A is not strictly dominated inA i¤a 2 SBX(A) ( (A) ; u);
a 2 A is not weakly dominated i¤ a 2 PBX(A) ( (A) ; u), where A =
i2NAi  i2NAi and X (A) = [int ( (A))]n. Note that X (A) is semi-
algebraic and Theorem 1 holds true for all (nitely many) A. Therefore,
we can nd a (relatively) closed, lower-dimensional semi-algebraic subset
V 0  Ui = RZ such that for all u 2 i2N (UinV 0) and k = 0; 1; :::; K 1, a 2
W k(u)nW k+1(u) i¤ a is strictly dominated in W k(u). That is,  W k(u)K
k=0
is an IESDS procedure in  (u). Since IESDS is order-independent, IEWDS
is generically an order-independent procedure. 
Proof of Corollary 4. By Theorem 1, there exists a (relatively) closed,
lower-dimensional semi-algebraic subset V 0  Ui = RZ such that, for
all u 2 i2N (UinV 0), SB(Y; u) = PB(Y; u) 8Y  Y. Suppose that a
sequential-MACA  (u) is supported by Y . Then, for all u 2 i2N (UinV 0),
Y  SB(coe(Y ); u) = PB(coe(Y ); u). Therefore,  (u) is also a perfect-
MACA supported by Y . Since every perfect-MACA is a sequential-MACA,
we conclude the proof. 
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